State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524

Porter was arrested in 2000 for molesting a minor and was indicted in 2000 and re-indicted in 2001 for aggravated child molestation and related offenses.
A new set of charges for child molestation emerged in 2005–2006 while Porter was on bond and briefly a fugitive in 2005–2006.
Porter filed pro se demands for trial in 2007; the trial court scheduled trial dates in 2008 but continued them at defense counsel's request.
In January 2009 Porter moved to dismiss both the 2001 and 2006 indictments for violation of speedy trial rights; the court denied the 2006 motion but dismissed the 2001 indictment.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the 2001 indictment; this Court granted certiorari and reversed, remanding for proper Barker analysis with correct facts.
The Georgia Supreme Court remands to the Court of Appeals to vacate and remand for a proper Barker balancing analysis based on correct facts and law.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Proper threshold delay calculation	Porter argues delay should start from arrest to denial/grant of speedy-trial motion.	State contends the Court of Appeals correctly used prior trial-date framing.	Delay calculated from arrest to speedy-trial ruling; eight-year span triggers Barker analysis.
Proper Barker balancing application	Trial court misapplied Barker by omitting assertion factor and misallocating delay.	State asserts Barker factors weighed in existing order.	Court of Appeals erred; remand for correct Barker balancing with proper facts and law.
Sufficiency of assertion of the right to speedy trial	Porter properly asserted the right via a motion to dismiss, not solely by demand for trial.	Lively-like rule downplays dismissal-motions as assertion of the right.	Porter's January 2009 motion sufficed to assert the right; extended delay weighed against Porter due to late assertion.
Prejudice and evidentiary basis	Evidence of prejudice (including missing witnesses) supported impairment of defense; Court of Appeals relied on presumptions.	Record lacked proper evidence of specific prejudice; claims were overstated.	Trial court's prejudice findings were unsupported; prejudice must be weighed with proper Barker analysis on remand.

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four-factor balancing; no factor is talismanic)
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (delays and prejudice weighed with ad hoc balancing)
Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52 (2008) (flexible Barker analysis in Georgia)
Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 598 (2004) (admonishes ad hoc weighing; threshold findings required)
Higgenbottom v. State, 288 Ga. 429 (2011) (requires explicit findings of Barker factors; remand for proper order)
Brown v. State, 287 Ga. 892 (2010) (extended delay weighed against defendant)
Layman v. State, 284 Ga. 83 (2008) (delay weighing against defendant for late assertion)
Harris v. State, 284 Ga. 455 (2008) (presumptive prejudice considerations; balancing required)
Robinson v. State, 287 Ga. 265 (2010) (recognizes assertion of speedy-trial right via motions)
Weis v. State, 287 Ga. 46 (2010) (considers assertion of speedy-trial rights and timing)
Bowling v. State, 285 Ga. 43 (2009) (context for asserting speedy-trial rights)
Lively v. State, 155 Ga. App. 402 (1980) (motion to dismiss not always an assertion of speedy trial)