State v. Pitts., 319 P.3d 456

Joseph Pitts, tried for second-degree attempted murder, repeatedly sought to fire appointed counsel and waived counsel mid-trial; John Schum became standby counsel.
During trial Pitts later sought Schum to resume representation; the court denied resumption, treating Pitts as continuing to represent himself and Schum as no longer counsel after verdict.
Jury returned a guilty verdict; Schum filed a post-verdict motion (with Pitts’ concurrence) to withdraw as standby counsel, appoint substitute counsel for post-trial and appeal, and declare a mistrial; the court denied relief and instructed Pitts to file post-verdict motions pro se.
Pitts filed multiple post-verdict motions pro se and repeatedly requested counsel at the May 12, 2010 hearing; the court denied appointment of counsel for post-verdict motions and for sentencing but appointed appellate counsel.
The ICA affirmed Pitts’ conviction; the Hawai‘i Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to whether the trial court erred in refusing to appoint substitute counsel for post-verdict motions and sentencing.
The Supreme Court held that post-trial motions and sentencing are critical stages under Article I, §14 of the Hawai‘i Constitution, and that the trial court erred by refusing to appoint substitute counsel for Pitts for (1) post-verdict motions (including a new-trial motion) and (2) sentencing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether post-verdict motions (e.g., motion for new trial) are a critical stage requiring appointment of counsel even after a mid-trial Faretta waiver	State: Defendant waived counsel at trial; his May 12 request was untimely and/or in bad faith given prior firings; court properly denied appointment	Pitts: Post-verdict and sentencing are critical stages; he expressly requested counsel and was entitled to appointment	Held: Post-trial motion stage is a critical stage under the Hawai‘i Constitution; trial court erred in refusing to appoint counsel for post-verdict motions; remand to appoint counsel and allow motion for new trial and resentencing
Whether sentencing requires appointment of counsel after a prior waiver during trial	State: Sentencing involved limited judicial discretion; counsel would not materially change outcome	Pitts: Sentencing is a critical stage where counsel can contest presentence information and preserve issues for appeal	Held: Sentencing is a critical stage; denial of substitute counsel for sentencing violated Pitts’ right to counsel; remand for appointment and resentencing

D'Ambrosio v. State, 146 P.3d 606 (Haw. App. 2006) (discusses right to counsel at critical stages such as sentencing and counsel's role in preventing misinformation)
Reponte v. State, 556 P.2d 577 (Haw. 1976) (recognizes right to counsel at every critical stage)
State v. Masaniai, 628 P.2d 1018 (Haw. 1981) (defines critical-stage prejudice concept)
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (right of self-representation)
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (limits on the right to self-representation and when counsel may be reinstated)
Menefield v. Borg, 881 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1989) (post-trial new-trial motions are a critical stage; post-trial requests for counsel presumptively should not be refused)
Rodgers v. Marshall, 678 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2012) (describes post-trial new-trial motion as a critical stage and discusses timely requests for counsel)
Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446 (2013) (Supreme Court reviewed Ninth Circuit ruling on the scope of clearly established federal law regarding post-trial counsel)