State v. Pittman, 21 N.E.3d 1118

Robert Pittman was ordered in 1988 to pay child support; his children were declared emancipated effective August 31, 2006, and a $34,313.45 arrearage was assessed against him in 2006.
Pittman was held in contempt in December 2007 for failing to pay arrears and was ordered to jail with most time suspended conditioned on beginning payments toward arrears.
A grand jury indicted Pittman in July 2009 on nine counts of nonsupport under R.C. 2919.21(B); counts allege failure to provide support as established by a court order. Several counts alleged conduct prior to July 1, 2007; counts 5 and 6 alleged conduct July 1, 2007–June 30, 2009 (arrearage-period failures).
Long delays followed the indictment; the trial court earlier dismissed several counts for speedy-trial and statute-of-limitations reasons, leaving counts 5 and 6. Pittman then moved to dismiss counts 5 and 6 arguing R.C. 2919.21(B) does not criminalize failure to pay an "arrearage-only" order.
The trial court granted dismissal of counts 5 and 6, adopting the view that R.C. 2919.21(B) requires a current legal obligation to support (present-tense "is"), which did not exist after emancipation; the State appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether R.C. 2919.21(B) criminalizes failure to pay an "arrearage-only" order (i.e., when no current child-support obligation exists)	Relying on the majority in Dissinger, the State argues that failure to pay court-ordered arrearages falls within R.C. 2919.21(B) liability.	Pittman argues the statute applies only when the defendant "is legally obligated to support" at the time of the alleged offense — i.e., a present/support obligation — so arrearage-only obligations after emancipation are not covered.	The court held R.C. 2919.21(B) requires a current legal obligation to support (present tense "is"); prosecution for an arrearage-only order when no current obligation exists is not permitted, so counts 5 and 6 were properly dismissed.
Application of rule of lenity / statutory ambiguity	The State contends the statute unambiguously covers arrearages (or that legislative scheme supports prosecution).	Pittman contends any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the accused under R.C. 2901.04 (rule of lenity).	The court found the statute unambiguous in its present-tense wording, but stated that even if ambiguous, the rule of lenity favors dismissal; thus dismissal stands.

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (speedy trial balancing test)
Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381 (rule of lenity and statutory ambiguity)
Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (statutory ambiguity principles)
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (criminal statutes construed narrowly)
Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621 (apply plain meaning of statute)
State v. S.R., 63 Ohio St.3d 590 (give effect to statutory words as written)
Cheap Escape Co., Inc. v. Haddox, L.L.C., 120 Ohio St.3d 493 (apply clear statutory language)
State v. Elmore, 122 Ohio St.3d 472 (ambiguity resolved in favor of accused in criminal statutes)
Cramer v. Petrie, 70 Ohio St.3d 131 (contempt jurisdiction for past-due support after obligation ends)
State v. Sorrell, 187 Ohio App.3d 286 (arrearages paid to custodial parent/state; arrearage different in character from current support)