State v. Pierce, 2017 Ohio 5791

Kenneth Pierce was indicted in Ohio on Jan. 27, 2015 for two counts of nonsupport of dependents (R.C. 2919.21(B)) covering July 2014–Jan. 2015; an arrest warrant issued the same day.
Pierce lived in Kentucky; he was arrested in Kentucky on the Ohio charges on March 15, 2016 and taken into Hamilton County custody by April 14, 2016.
Pierce moved to dismiss the indictment on April 19, 2016, arguing the ~14½-month delay between indictment and return of the warrant violated his constitutional speedy-trial right.
At the hearing the state asserted it had sought Kentucky to serve the warrant and that Pierce had not kept a current address with child-support-related agencies; the state offered no evidentiary support for these assertions.
The trial court denied the motion; Pierce pleaded no contest and was sentenced to community control.
On appeal the First District applied the Barker four-factor test and reversed, concluding Pierce’s Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right was violated and ordering the indictment dismissed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 14+ month delay between indictment and return of warrant violated the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right	State: delay attributable to Kentucky authorities; time should be measured to when Pierce first learned of arrest (Mar. 15, 2016); no particularized prejudice shown	Pierce: delay between indictment (Jan. 27, 2015) and effective service/return of warrant (~Apr. 14, 2016) was presumptively prejudicial and state offered no explanation or evidence	Court: Delay (>1 year) was presumptively prejudicial; all four Barker factors favored Pierce; constitutional speedy-trial right violated; indictment must be dismissed

Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (U.S. 1967) (Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (articulated four-factor balancing test for speedy-trial claims)
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (U.S. 1992) (presumption of prejudice from lengthy delays; relief where presumption not rebutted)
State v. Selvage, 80 Ohio St.3d 465 (Ohio 1997) (applies Barker factors; shorter delay tolerated for ordinary crimes)
State v. Triplett, 78 Ohio St.3d 566 (Ohio 1997) (government’s effort to notify defendant relevant to delay analysis)
State v. Meeker, 26 Ohio St.2d 9 (Ohio 1971) (speedy-trial guarantee covers delays before and after indictment)
State v. Sears, 166 Ohio App.3d 166 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (presumed prejudice where state failed to use reasonable diligence in notifying defendant)
State v. Rice, 57 N.E.3d 84 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (review standard for mixed question of law and fact on speedy-trial motions)
United States v. Brown, 169 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 1999) (government bears burden to explain delay)