State v. Phlipot
0903021873
| Del. Super. Ct. | May 24, 2017Background
- Matthew M. Phlipot was convicted after a 2010 jury trial of two counts of Rape in the Fourth Degree, six counts of Witness Tampering, 27 counts of Criminal Contempt, and one count of Falsely Reporting an Incident; convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.
- Sentences included Level V terms for rape counts (one 5-year, one 15-year with portions suspended) and concurrent sentences for other counts.
- Phlipot filed multiple collateral challenges: a first Rule 61 motion denied by the Superior Court (affirmed on appeal), a federal habeas petition denied as time-barred, and this second Rule 61 motion filed in 2017.
- The second Rule 61 motion asserted (1) newly discovered exculpatory evidence: emails from an account tied to a "Cullen Jones" and IP-address data allegedly linking those emails to the victim (K.K.), and (2) prosecutorial misconduct: suppression/threats preventing admission of the emails at trial.
- The Superior Court found the motion procedurally barred under Rule 61(i) as both time‑barred and a successive motion, and held Phlipot failed to plead with particularity that the new evidence established actual innocence; the court also found the proffered evidence was impeaching, not newly discovered, and not sufficiently reliable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness/Successive‑motion bar under Rule 61(i) | Phlipot contends newly discovered IP/e‑mail evidence and prosecutorial suppression excuse the delay and satisfy pleading requirements for a successive Rule 61 motion | His new claims are based on recent IP discovery and alleged prior suppression by the prosecutor | Motion is time‑barred and successive; Phlipot failed to satisfy Rule 61(i)(2) pleading requirements, so procedurally barred |
| Actual‑innocence gateway to overcome procedural bars | The IP evidence and emails create a strong inference of actual innocence because they show the victim authored emails seeking payment for testimony | The new evidence would prove the victim fabricated testimony and thus exonerate Phlipot | Court held evidence is not sufficiently reliable or truly new to meet Schlup standard; no reasonable juror would be compelled to acquit based on it |
| Availability/newness of the IP evidence | Phlipot claims he only recently learned how to obtain IP data and could not have accessed it before trial | Court notes Phlipot previously demonstrated technical sophistication (created hidden e‑mail account) and had opportunity to obtain the data pretrial | Court finds no adequate showing that evidence was unavailable before trial; not newly discovered |
| Prosecutorial misconduct/Brady claim | Phlipot alleges the prosecutor suppressed exculpatory evidence and threatened new charges to prevent admission of the emails | Prosecutor reasonably questioned authenticity and foundation of the emails; charging decisions were appropriate after evidence developed | Court rejects claim as speculative and part of a pattern of blame‑shifting; even if warnings occurred, they were not improper suppression of exculpatory evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Phlipot v. State, 19 A.3d 302 (Del. 2011) (direct appeal affirming convictions and discussing defendant's deceptive conduct)
- State v. Phlipot, 64 A.3d 856 (Del. Super. Ct. 2012) (denial of first Rule 61 motion and findings on email evidence and counsel strategy)
- Phlipot v. State, 65 A.3d 617 (Del. 2013) (affirming denial of first postconviction relief)
- Hicks v. State, 913 A.2d 1189 (Del. 2006) (newly discovered evidence that is merely impeaching or cumulative does not warrant a new trial)