State v. Phillips, 1211004419

Background

Phillips was indicted on 24 charges from a 2009 incident (knife thrown at one victim; another shot in the stomach); he pled guilty on Feb. 10, 2015 to Assault 1st, PFDCF, and Gang Participation; other charges dismissed under an open-sentencing plea agreement.
Truth-in-Sentencing form and plea agreement informed Phillips of rights waived, potential penalties (minimum 5 years, maximum 53 years); plea colloquy occurred and court accepted plea as knowing, intelligent, voluntary.
Sentencing (Nov. 13, 2015): Assault 1st — 20 years Level 5, suspended after 8 years to 2 years Level 3; PFDCF — 5 years Level 5 (mandatory); Gang Participation — 2 years Level 5, suspended to 1 year Level 2.
Phillips filed a timely Rule 61 postconviction motion asserting: plea was not knowing due to his education/counsel’s explanations; plea was coerced by a promise that the mother of his children (Ms. Santiago) would not receive felony charges; sentencing judge was biased because he presided over a co-defendant’s trial.
The record was expanded, counsel submitted an affidavit, the State responded, and the Commissioner reviewed the plea transcript, sentencing transcript, plea paperwork, and counsel’s affidavit in denying relief.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Phillips’ plea was knowing and voluntary	The State: plea colloquy, plea agreement, and TIS form show Phillips understood charges, rights waived, and penalties	Phillips: education and counsel’s explanation undermined his understanding so plea was not knowing	Denied — thorough colloquy and documents show plea was knowing, intelligent, voluntary
Whether plea was coerced by promise re: Ms. Santiago	The State: no promise was made; counsel attempted to help but made no guarantees; Santiago made independent decisions	Phillips: he was promised his child’s mother would not be prosecuted for felonies, inducing his plea	Denied — record shows counsel tried to intercede but made no promises; Phillips denied coercion in court
Whether sentencing judge was biased due to exposure to co-defendant’s trial	The State: sentence based on permissible factors (charges, history, arguments, defendant statement) and within statutory limits	Phillips: judge presiding over co-defendant trial may have been privy to incriminating evidence, causing excessive sentence	Denied — no record evidence of bias or vindictiveness; sentence within statutory limits and based on appropriate factors
Ineffective assistance of counsel claim	The State: counsel advised Phillips, negotiated, attempted mitigation and advocacy at sentencing; conduct was reasonable	Phillips: trial counsel performed inadequately (impliedly alleging failures that affected plea/sentence)	Denied — counsel’s conduct fell within reasonable professional standards; no prejudice shown that would have led Phillips to reject plea

Key Cases Cited

Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552 (Del. 1990) (procedural considerations for postconviction claims)
State v. Wright, 653 A.2d 288 (Del. Super. 1994) (standard for assessing ineffective assistance of counsel)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)