State v. Philip Dubord, 03-15-00553-CR

Background

Early morning stop of Philip Dubord (DWI case with enhancement) after Officer Johnson observed lane changes on West Sixth Street and followed for ~6 miles before stopping.
At the suppression hearing only Sergeant Johnson (the detaining officer) testified; defense argued the stop was unlawful because officer delayed the stop despite observing violations.
Trial court initially found Johnson observed lane changes and followed Dubord, and found the six-mile delay diminished the officer’s credibility; trial court granted suppression (order entered Aug. 5, 2015).
The Third Court of Appeals abated and remanded for supplemental findings because the original findings did not address (1) other events the officer relied on (e.g., later erratic driving), and (2) an explicit credibility determination.
On remand the trial court found that, absent missing video, Johnson’s testimony was "insufficiently credible" to believe any traffic violations occurred and concluded the stop and arrest lacked objective probable cause.
The State appealed the sufficiency of the supplemental findings, arguing they remain ambiguous, fail to address reasonable suspicion of intoxication based on the totality of circumstances, and improperly condition credibility on video corroboration.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Dubord)	Held
Whether Officer Johnson had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop	Reasonable suspicion can arise from the totality of circumstances (lane changes + later erratic driving + officer experience); credibility need not depend on video; supplemental findings are inadequate	Officer contends stop was unlawful because officer followed him for six miles after initial lane changes and only then stopped; court suppressed evidence	Procedural posture: Third Court previously abated and remanded for supplemental findings; trial court then found officer testimony not credible (without video) and that there was no probable cause; State now argues findings still inadequate and asks for further remand
Whether actual traffic violations are required to support reasonable suspicion	No—reasonable suspicion is based on totality of circumstances; no single statutory violation is required	Emphasizes initial lane-change observations and the delay in stopping	Court must evaluate totality; State argues trial court’s supplemental findings incorrectly suggest traffic violations are necessary
Whether credibility determination improperly relied on missing video	State: factfinder may judge credibility without video corroboration; conditioning credibility on missing video is improper	Defense: trial court questioned officer credibility because of delay and missing video	Trial court found testimony "insufficiently credible absent the missing videotape"; State asserts this is ambiguous and improper
Whether the supplemental findings address reasonable suspicion of intoxication	State: Officer’s training/experience plus observed erratic driving could support reasonable suspicion for intoxication; findings failed to address this theory	Defense maintained suppression based on illegality of stop; did not contest arrest reasonableness at hearing	Trial court did not expressly resolve reasonable-suspicion-of-intoxication theory; State requests further findings to permit appellate review

Key Cases Cited

Annis v. State, 578 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (officer opinion testimony can alone support intoxication findings)
Villareal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (trial court is sole trier of fact and credibility determinations at suppression hearings)
Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (reasonable-suspicion inquiry is based on the totality of the circumstances)
Curtis v. State, 238 S.W.3d 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (same—totality standard for reasonable suspicion)
Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (court may scrutinize reliability of findings when their credibility is in doubt)
Fierro v. State, 969 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998) (testimony alone may suffice to prove intoxication)