State v. Pettitt, 104 A.3d 85

Defendant was charged with violating a relief-from-abuse (RFA) order (stay 300 feet) and violating a condition of release that prohibited contacting his girlfriend for an incident on Feb. 2, 2012.
Trial turned on credibility: the girlfriend and a third-party housemate testified defendant went to the girlfriend’s home; defendant testified he did not.
During cross-exam, the girlfriend volunteered nonresponsive statements about PTSD, being shot at, a loaded gun, and drinking; the prosecutor objected, the court’s rulings were unclear, and defense did not move to strike or request a curative instruction but later moved for mistrial after further nonresponsive testimony.
The jury convicted; defendant moved for acquittal/new trial (denied) and appealed, arguing the nonresponsive testimony required mistrial and later challenged a probation condition restricting residence.
At resentencing the court replaced home-confinement furlough with a work-crew condition and imposed a residence condition: reside at parents’ address (68 US Route 2), with any future change requiring probation officer approval.
Parties later stipulated that the court lacked authority to impose an increased consecutive sentence; court remanded to consider the stipulation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a mistrial after the girlfriend’s nonresponsive, prejudicial testimony	The State argued the testimony did not require mistrial; any prejudice was not sufficiently prejudicial given other evidence and court discretion	Petit argued the volunteered testimony (404(b)-type allegations) unfairly prejudiced the jury and warranted a mistrial or, at minimum, a curative instruction	Denial of mistrial affirmed: court did not abuse discretion because prejudice was not shown to be controlling, defendant failed to seek a curative instruction or move to strike, and there was additional corroborating testimony
Whether the probation condition requiring residence at a specific address (and requiring probation-officer approval to change if unable to live there) was overbroad	State argued the condition was tailored to rehabilitative needs (family/employment supervision) and replaced home confinement DOC would not implement	Petit argued the condition improperly delegated broad discretion to probation and was overbroad under Freeman/Moses	Condition upheld: distinguishable from Freeman/Moses because it prescribes a specific address tied to rehabilitation and supervision goals; condition valid

State v. Messier, 885 A.2d 1193 (Vt. 2005) (standard of review for denial of mistrial)
State v. Covell, 453 A.2d 1118 (Vt. 1982) (movant bears burden to show prejudice from denial of mistrial)
State v. Turner, 491 A.2d 338 (Vt. 1985) (defense counsel must request curative measures to preserve claim where available)
State v. Freeman, 70 A.3d 1008 (Vt. 2013) (probation condition requiring residence/work where probation officer approves held overbroad)
State v. Moses, 618 A.2d 478 (Vt. 1992) (probation condition delegating broad authority to probation officer was unduly restrictive)
State v. Rivers, 878 A.2d 1070 (Vt. 2005) (probation conditions valid if reasonably necessary for public protection and offender rehabilitation)