State v. Perez, 322 Conn. 118

Background

Eddie A. Perez, former mayor of Hartford, was tried on two unrelated criminal informations (bribery/fabrication and larceny by extortion) that the state successfully moved to consolidate; he objected throughout.
The bribery case alleged Perez accepted free home renovations from contractor Carlos Costa in exchange for official acts (expedited payments and interfering with bond actions); Costa testified he did the work for free and later billed/was paid at below-market amounts.
The state presented recorded statements and investigatory evidence suggesting Perez lied about payment timing and that an invoice was fabricated; defense cross-examination and limited defense witnesses contested aspects of that proof.
Midtrial, after hearing the state’s bribery evidence, Perez moved to sever so he could testify in the bribery case but remain silent in the extortion case; he argued his testimony was critical to rebut the bribery elements and that testifying generally would expose him to prejudicial cross-examination in the extortion matter.
The trial court denied two midtrial severance motions (first at close of state’s bribery case; second after the extortion evidence), relying on timeliness concerns and a presumption favoring joinder; Perez remained silent at trial and was convicted.
The Appellate Court reversed and ordered separate retrials; the Connecticut Supreme Court granted certification on severance/testimony issue and affirmed the Appellate Court, holding the trial court abused its discretion by denying timely, sufficiently detailed severance proffers.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether denial of midtrial severance improperly deprived defendant of ability to testify in one joined case but not the other	State: Severance motion was untimely and defendant failed to timely proffer required details; judicial economy and presumption for joinder justified denial	Perez: After hearing state’s bribery evidence, he made a timely, specific proffer showing important testimony for bribery count and a strong need to remain silent on extortion count	The court held the first midtrial motion was timely and the proffer adequate; denial was an abuse of discretion because prejudice to defendant’s right to testify outweighed judicial economy
Standard for when selective testimony requires severance	State: Defendant must have met the Schroff/Baker standard pretrial and here failed to do so	Perez: Schroff standard satisfied by convincing showing of important testimony on one count and strong need to refrain on the other; may be made midtrial once need crystallizes	Court reiterates Schroff: severance required only after convincing showing of (1) important testimony on one count and (2) strong need not to testify on the other; Perez met that standard midtrial
Sufficiency of defendant's proffer to permit balancing of prejudice vs. judicial economy	State: Proffer was insufficiently detailed to allow court to balance interests	Perez: Proffer described specific topics (timing of bill/payment, wife’s illness, reasons for official acts, explanation for alleged lie) and was sufficient	Court found the proffer sufficiently specific and conceded trial court did not evaluate its substance before denying; proffer permitted required balancing
Whether proposed testimony was cumulative/insignificant (and thus no prejudice)	State: Defendant’s testimony would be cumulative, unbelievable, or immaterial to bribery elements	Perez: His live testimony was uniquely suited to explain intent and credibility matters and was not replaceable by others’ testimony	Court held proposed testimony went to essential bribery elements (receipt/quid pro quo and intent) and could have meaningfully rebutted the state; cumulative argument rejected

Key Cases Cited

Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (joinder of distinct offenses may coerce defendant to testify on all or none and produce undue prejudice)
Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (defendant may face a dilemma if testifying on one count but not another; selective testimony not automatic basis for severance but may require it)
State v. Schroff, 198 Conn. 405 (Conn. 1986) (adopts federal two-part test requiring convincing showing of important testimony on one count and strong need to refrain on another)
State v. King, 187 Conn. 292 (Conn. 1982) (severance for selective testimony is within trial court discretion but must weigh judicial economy against defendant’s right to choose)
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398 (U.S. 1999) (bribery requires corrupt intent and a quid pro quo; intent may be proved circumstantially)
United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006 (4th Cir. 1998) (intent in bribery prosecutions may be established by circumstantial evidence)