State v. Perdew
2021 Ohio 3075
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2021Background
- 2016–2017 abuse reports involving victim C.P.; 2016 investigation noted alleged BB-gun shootings; further complaints in Nov. 2017 led to Perdew’s arrest.
- Nov. 6, 2017: municipal complaints (domestic violence, assault, endangering children); Nov. 15, 2017: Perdew pled guilty to domestic violence; other municipal counts dismissed.
- Sept. 21, 2018: grand jury indicted Perdew on felony felonious assault (alleged BB-gun injury in 2016) and two counts of endangering children (broader date ranges).
- Dec. 7, 2018: state filed a superseding indictment that only expanded the date range in Count Three; bill of particulars supplied Jan. 28, 2019.
- Perdew moved to dismiss (speedy-trial and double jeopardy); trial court denied the motions after hearings; Perdew pled no contest, convictions entered, concurrent prison terms imposed; appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Perdew) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the speedy-trial clock for the 2018 felony indictment start with the Nov. 2017 municipal arrest/charges? | The felony indictment alleges different acts, dates, methods, and injuries than the municipal misdemeanor; Baker permits a new 270‑day period. | The state knew the full scope of abuse in 2017; the indictments arose from the same facts so the speedy clock began with the municipal arrest. | The court held the felony counts arose from different facts/dates/injuries than the municipal conviction, so the speedy clock reset with the felony indictment. |
| Do tolling periods and motions filed during the initial indictment carry over to the superseding indictment that only changed Count Three’s date range? | Yes; Blackburn controls — tolling caused by defendant motions in the earlier charging period applies where the superseding indictment is based on the same underlying facts and adds no new charges. | No; tolling from the initial indictment should not be applied to the superseding indictment. | The court applied tolling (discovery requests, motions, continuances) to the period and found the State brought Perdew to trial within 270 days (268 days counted). |
| Did double jeopardy bar the felony prosecution because Perdew earlier pled guilty to municipal domestic violence? | The misdemeanors and felonies require proof of different facts (dates, conduct, injuries); successive prosecutions were for different offenses. | The municipal conviction and later felony charges prosecuted the same underlying abuse twice, violating double jeopardy. | The court held no double jeopardy violation: the municipal conviction involved distinct facts/dates/injuries from the felony charges. |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (establishes the constitutional speedy-trial balancing test)
- State v. Baker, 78 Ohio St.3d 108 (Ohio 1997) (holds rule is disjunctive: subsequent indictment gets new speedy-trial period if based on different facts or if state lacked knowledge earlier)
- State v. Blackburn, 118 Ohio St.3d 163 (Ohio 2008) (periods of delay from motions in a prior case apply to subsequent case based on same underlying facts)
- State v. Brown, 98 Ohio St.3d 121 (Ohio 2002) (demand for discovery or bill of particulars tolls speedy-trial time)
- State v. Palmer, 112 Ohio St.3d 457 (Ohio 2007) (defendant’s failure to respond to a prosecution reciprocal-discovery request may toll speedy-trial time)
- State v. Sellords, 17 Ohio St.3d 169 (Ohio 1985) (precise times and dates are ordinarily not essential elements of offenses)