State v. Pentecost
2016 S.D. 84
| S.D. | 2016Background
- In April 2012 John T. Pentecost rekeyed and entered the house he had shared with his ex-wife L.S., though he had not lived there for over a year; he brought items (zip ties, duct tape, a sales slip for a handgun, a suicide note, and his will) and a shotgun/ammunition was found in his car.
- L.S. had changed the locks, did not want further contact, and the parties’ divorce decree had provided for sale of the home and language about transfer of Pentecost’s interest, but the house had not sold and his name remained on the deed when he entered.
- Pentecost was arrested and indicted for second-degree burglary and alternative misdemeanor stalking counts; a part II information alleged a prior stalking conviction for sentencing enhancement.
- Pentecost moved to dismiss the burglary count arguing he was licensed/privileged to enter as a joint owner; the trial court denied the motion, finding license/privilege was a jury question.
- Pentecost pleaded guilty (with some discussion of an Alford plea) to second-degree burglary pursuant to a plea deal (dismissal of other charges and sentencing cap); he was sentenced to six years. He later sought to withdraw the plea and to set aside the judgment; the trial court denied relief on resentencing and this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether court erred denying motion to dismiss on ground Pentecost was "licensed or privileged" to enter under SDCL 22-32-3 | State: license/privilege is a factual element for the trier of fact; charging documents and court have jurisdiction | Pentecost: retained ownership interest so could not be guilty of burglary; charging document insufficient to show lack of ownership | Court: jurisdiction not implicated; license/privilege hinges on possession/occupancy (totality of circumstances), not mere title; denial of motion to dismiss affirmed |
| Whether trial court abused discretion denying motion to withdraw guilty plea and set aside judgment after sentencing | State: delay, prejudice to prosecution, and plea was knowing and supported; court properly exercised discretion | Pentecost: maintained innocence, misapprehension of law, and novel legal issue justify withdrawal | Court: applied "manifest injustice" standard, found plea knowingly made, delay was long and prejudicial; denial not an abuse of discretion |
| Whether court accepted guilty plea without adequate factual basis for second-degree burglary | State: record (police reports, grand jury transcripts, plea colloquy) supplied strong factual basis | Pentecost: equivocal admission, maintained innocence, argued factual basis insufficient and intent to commit stalking not shown | Court: factual basis adequate (entry, not licensed/privileged, intent to commit crime inferred from items and conduct); plea valid despite claim of ownership or equivocal statements |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Pentecost, 868 N.W.2d 590 (S.D. 2015) (prior opinion remanding for SDCL 23A-27-51 findings)
- State v. Nachtigall, 741 N.W.2d 216 (S.D. 2007) (Rule 11: factual basis for plea may come from anything on the record)
- Gakin v. City of Rapid City, 698 N.W.2d 493 (S.D. 2005) (ignorance of law is not a defense)
- State v. McMillian, 973 A.2d 287 (N.H. 2009) (license/privilege to enter is a question of fact judged by totality of circumstances)
- State v. Hagedorn, 679 N.W.2d 666 (Iowa 2004) (ownership alone does not establish right to enter; focus is possessory/occupancy interest)