309 P.3d 506
Wash. Ct. App.2013Background
- Joseph Peltier was originally charged in 2002 with four felonies within applicable limitation periods; he stipulated to a bench trial and the State filed an amended information in 2003 charging lesser offenses that were time-barred.
- The stipulation contained an express waiver by Peltier of objections based on statutes of limitations to refiling additional or greater charges.
- The superior court accepted the stipulation, convicted and sentenced Peltier in 2004; the convictions were later vacated in a PRP after the State conceded the amended-information charges were time-barred.
- After dismissal of the time-barred amended information, the State filed a second amended information in 2012 re‑charging four felonies, some identical to counts in the original 2002 information but all alleged to have been filed after the applicable statutes of limitation had expired.
- Peltier moved to dismiss arguing the expired limitation periods deprived the superior court of subject matter jurisdiction; the superior court granted dismissal. The State appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether expiration of a criminal statute of limitations divests the superior court of subject matter jurisdiction | State: limitation is not jurisdictional for superior court felonies; the protection can be waived by the defendant (here by plea/stipulation) | Peltier: expiry of the statutory limitation deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction and the charges must be dismissed | Court: affirmed dismissal but held limitation periods do not strip superior courts of subject matter jurisdiction; instead, a court lacks authority to enter convictions/sentence on charges brought after the statutory period and cannot enforce a waiver purporting to validate such prosecution |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Personal Restraint of Stoudmire, 141 Wn.2d 342 (2000) (court cannot enter judgment/sentence on charges filed after statute of limitations; plea waiver cannot supply authority beyond statute)
- Young v. Clark, 149 Wn.2d 130 (2003) (constitution grants broad original jurisdiction to superior courts; legislature may not remove that subject matter jurisdiction unless vested elsewhere)
- Shoop v. Kittitas County, 149 Wn.2d 29 (2003) (statutory venue requirement does not deprive superior court of subject matter jurisdiction)
- Marley v. Dept. of Labor & Indus., 125 Wn.2d 533 (1994) (distinguishes subject matter jurisdiction from a tribunal’s lack of authority to enter a particular order)
- Moen v. State, 129 Wn.2d 535 (1996) (untimely exercise of a power, e.g., restitution after statutory time, is not necessarily a jurisdictional defect)