State v. Pederson, 801 N.W.2d 723

Pederson suspected in Grand Forks-area armed robberies; police obtained a search warrant for his residence on Dec 22, 2009 and surveilled him; Pederson and a confidential informant went to a motel and reserved a room; informant later met officers and provided details that Pederson used a BB gun in robberies and might be escalating violence; four officers entered the motel room with weapons drawn after Pederson allegedly consented to entry, arrested him, and transported him for questioning.
Pederson was Mirandized at the police station after arrest and agreed to speak; a recording captured his interview, during which he admitted involvement in robberies.
Pederson was charged with one robbery count on Jan 6, 2010 adding several counts including possession of controlled substances and drug paraphernalia.
Pederson moved to suppress all evidence obtained after the motel-entry, arguing illegal arrest at the motel and requests for counsel. The district court denied suppression, concluding consent to entry was voluntary and statements could be admitted; Pederson later pled guilty reserving suppression issues for appeal.
On appeal, the issue is whether the motel-entry was lawful, whether any statements after a supposed invocation of counsel must be suppressed, and whether the Harris attenuation doctrine applies to allow admission of station-house statements.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the motel-room entry violated the Fourth Amendment.	Pederson did not voluntarily consent to entry.	Consent was coerced by armed officers; entry unlawful absent exigent circumstances.	Unlawful entry; suppression of subsequent evidence and statements contemplated.
Whether the statements at the police station were admissible under the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine given an unlawful entry.	All post-entry statements are fruit of the unlawful entry.	Under Harris, statements outside the home may be admitted if probable cause existed before entry.	Station statements admitted under Harris because there was probable cause to arrest before entry.
Whether Pederson unambiguously invoked his right to counsel during interrogation.	Pederson clearly invoked counsel.	Invocation was ambiguous; interrogation could continue.	Invocation was not unambiguous; questioning continued with consent.
Whether the North Dakota Constitution provides greater protection than the U.S. Constitution and affects the Harris rule in this state.	ND Constitution may offer greater protection.	No analysis shown; federal standard governs.	ND Supreme Court has not adopted Harris for state constitution; Harris analysis treated as controlling.

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (U.S. Supreme Court 1980) (prohibits warrantless home entries for routine arrests; applies to motels as temporary dwellings)
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (U.S. Supreme Court 1964) (extends Fourth Amendment to temporary dwellings like motel rooms)
Woinarowicz, 2006 ND 179, 720 N.W.2d 635 (North Dakota Supreme Court 2006) (reiterates consent as a Fourth Amendment exception and volitional standard)
Ellison, City of Fargo, 2001 ND 175, 635 N.W.2d 151 (North Dakota Supreme Court 2001) (totality-of-circumstances test for voluntary consent to enter)
New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (U.S. Supreme Court 1990) (limitations on exclusionary rule when probable cause exists; attenuation principle noted)