State v. Patton, 1 CA-CR 15-0815-PRPC

Petitioner Joshua Eugene Patton was tried on multiple charges; a jury convicted him only of misconduct involving weapons (prohibited possessor) and acquitted him of burglary, armed robbery, theft, two counts of aggravated assault, and endangerment.
Patton was sentenced as a repetitive offender to a presumptive 10-year term; the conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.
At trial, defense counsel moved to sever the misconduct-with-weapons count because proving prohibited-possessor status required introducing prior convictions that could prejudice the other charges.
The trial court (with defense counsel’s agreement) ruled the State could only proceed on the weapons count if Patton testified, since his testimony would make his prior convictions admissible for impeachment; effectively severing the count unless impeachment became available.
Patton later testified; his prior convictions were used to impeach him, and the State then proceeded on the weapons charge.
Patton filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for agreeing to the conditional severance; the superior court summarily dismissed the petition and this court granted review but denied relief.

Issue	Patton's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether counsel was ineffective for agreeing the weapons count would be tried only if Patton testified	Counsel’s agreement effectively forced Patton to choose between testifying and losing severance, constituting deficient strategy	The court’s conditional severance was a proper exercise of discretion to avoid undue prejudice; counsel’s agreement was reasonable	Counsel’s conduct was not deficient; no ineffective assistance shown
Whether Patton was prejudiced by counsel’s agreement	Patton would have been better off if the firearms count had been severed outright—possible better plea or different outcome	Patton was acquitted of other counts, and because he testified his priors were admissible anyway, so no prejudice from reusing them on the weapons count	No prejudice shown; speculative harms (e.g., plea prospects) insufficient

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes ineffective-assistance two-prong test)
State v. Burns, 237 Ariz. 1 (discusses prejudice from introducing prior convictions and severance considerations)
State v. Pandeli, 242 Ariz. 175 (addresses when counsel’s strategic choices do not constitute deficient performance)
Hedlund v. Sheldon, 173 Ariz. 143 (recognizes trial judges’ discretion to adopt individualized procedures to promote justice)