State v. Padley
2014 WI App 65
Wis. Ct. App.2014Background
- Megan Padley drove a car that collided with a motorcycle; the motorcycle passenger later died from injuries.
- A sheriff's deputy who investigated observed facts (skid marks, vehicle positions, Padley’s account) and concluded Padley’s attempted U‑turn interfered with the motorcycle.
- The deputy read Padley an "Informing the Accused" form under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2. (2011‑12) and she consented to a blood draw; there was no arrest and no observed signs of impairment.
- Padley stipulated that she would have refused a blood draw if the deputy had only asked without reading the form; the blood test detected a controlled substance used at trial.
- Padley moved to suppress arguing (1) § 343.305(3)(ar)2. is unconstitutional (facial), (2) her consent was involuntary/coerced by a "false threat," and (3) the deputy lacked "reason to believe" a traffic violation occurred. The circuit court denied suppression; Padley appealed.
- The court of appeals affirmed: it rejected Padley’s facial constitutional challenges, found consent voluntary, and held the deputy had the minimal "reason to believe" required by the statute.
Issues
| Issue | Padley’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(ar)2. is facially unconstitutional as authorizing warrantless blood draws in violation of the Fourth Amendment | The statute authorizes (or results in) compelled evidentiary blood draws without probable cause or exigency, so it is facially unconstitutional | The statute does not compel searches; it permits offering a choice under implied consent (consent or statutory penalties), which is constitutional | Court held statute is not facially unconstitutional; it authorizes presenting a choice, not automatically compelling a search |
| 2. Whether § 343.305(3)(ar)2. violates equal protection or is unconstitutionally vague | The statute treats a class of drivers differently and lacks a required nexus between the traffic violation and the injury or evidence, making it arbitrary and vague | The statute does not compel searches or single out drivers for warrantless searches; Padley’s facts fall plainly within the statute so vagueness claim fails | Equal protection and vagueness challenges rejected; Padley cannot rely on hypothetical scenarios and her conduct fits the statute |
| 3. Whether Padley’s consent was voluntary or coerced by a "false threat" (informing of penalties) | Reading the informing form coerced consent by threatening penalty for exercising a Fourth Amendment right, rendering consent involuntary | Advising of statutory consequences is truthful and constitutionally permissible inducement; voluntary consent remains valid | Consent was voluntary; informing of implied‑consent penalties did not constitute improper coercion |
| 4. Whether the deputy had the statutory "reason to believe" Padley violated a traffic law (trigger for using § 343.305(3)(ar)2.) | Available scene facts (car in lane, skid marks, Padley’s statement) were insufficient to reasonably suspect Padley caused or contributed to the collision | Skid marks, vehicle positions, and Padley’s maneuver provided at least a minimal suspicion that her U‑turn interfered with the motorcycle | Court held deputy had the minimal "reason to believe" required; factual findings supported requesting the test |
Key Cases Cited
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (warrantless blood draw may be reasonable when arrest, probable cause, and exigent circumstances exist)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) (metabolization of alcohol alone does not create a per se exigency for warrantless blood draws)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (consent must be voluntary under totality of circumstances)
- Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (consent vitiated if based on assertion of legal authority when none exists)
- State v. Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d 39 (implied consent law’s purpose to facilitate chemical testing and penalties for refusal)
- Village of Little Chute v. Walitalo, 256 Wis. 2d 1032 (advising driver of implied‑consent sanctions does not per se render consent involuntary)
- State v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293 (interpretation of "reason to believe" as a minimal suspicion standard)