State v. Owen
2013 Ohio 2824
Ohio Ct. App.2013Background
- Tamara J. Owen pled guilty to third-degree felony OVI under R.C. 4511.19(A)(2) (prior felony OVI within 20 years and refusal to submit to chemical test).
- Trial court accepted a joint recommendation (2 years prison + 3 years suspended + 5 years community control) but sentenced Owen to a five-year term (serve 2 years, suspend 3) based on its view that R.C. 4511.19 authorized a 5-year maximum.
- H.B. 86 (effective Sept. 30, 2011) revised R.C. 2929.14(A)(3), creating a two-tier scheme: certain violent third-degree felonies retain a 5-year maximum; other third-degree felonies have a 3-year maximum.
- R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(e)(ii) (OVI statute) expressly authorizes a total prison term of up to five years for the covered OVI offense (including mandatory and additional terms).
- The core legal question: which statute controls the maximum sentence for third-degree felony OVI — the specific OVI statute authorizing up to five years, or the later-enacted general sentencing statute capping most third-degree felonies at three years?
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which statutory maximum governs sentencing for third-degree felony OVI (5 years under R.C. 4511.19 vs. 3 years under R.C. 2929.14(A)(3))? | State: both statutes create ambiguity; apply interpretive rules (R.C. 1.49) to preserve the 5-year OVI term. | Owen: H.B. 86 (R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)) is later and limits non-listed third-degree felonies to 3 years; it therefore prevails and furthers H.B. 86’s goal of minimum sanctions. | Court: R.C. 2929.14(A)(3) (as enacted in H.B. 86) is later and irreconcilable with R.C. 4511.19; under R.C. 1.52 the later statute prevails, so the maximum is 3 years. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23 (appellate two-step review for felony sentencing: legality then abuse of discretion)
- State ex rel. Francis v. Sours, 143 Ohio St. (statutory interpretation seeks legislative intent)
- Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101 (apply unambiguous statutory language as written)
- State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 74 Ohio St.3d 543 (no further interpretation when statute is unambiguous)
- State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Allen County Bd. of Commrs., 32 Ohio St.3d 24 (ambiguity exists only when language supports more than one reasonable interpretation)
- State ex rel. Toledo Edison Co. v. Clyde, 76 Ohio St.3d 508 (definition of statutory ambiguity)