State v. Otton
185 Wash. 2d 673
| Wash. | 2016Background
- Otton and the victim were intimate partners; after a December 2012 incident the victim gave a written, sworn (perjury-penalized) police statement accusing Otton of choking and threats. The State charged Otton with second-degree assault and felony harassment.
- At trial the victim recanted, testifying her prior allegations were false; she was cross-examined about the police statement.
- The trial court admitted the prior sworn police statement as substantive evidence under ER 801(d)(1)(i); Otton was convicted. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
- Otton asked the Washington Supreme Court to overrule State v. Smith (interpreting ER 801(d)(1)(i)) and hold that police interviews are not “other proceeding[s]” for purposes of admitting prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence.
- The core legal question: whether Smith’s case-by-case, reliability-based approach to the undefined phrase “other proceeding” remains correct or should be rejected under stare decisis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Smith’s interpretation of “other proceeding” in ER 801(d)(1)(i) should be overruled | Smith is incorrect: “other proceeding” should be limited to proceedings similar to trials/hearings (adversarial, official record, neutral officer); police interviews fall outside | Smith reasonably read the rule’s open-ended language and legislative history; the four-factor test limits abuse and preserves reliability safeguards | Court refuses to overrule Smith; affirms admission and convictions |
| Whether ER 801(d)(1)(i) plain language compels a bright-line rule excluding police interviews | The rule’s context (trial, hearing, deposition) implies similar formal proceedings only | The phrase “other proceeding” is open-ended and includes non-judicial sworn proceedings like some police or quasi-judicial interviews | Court finds Smith’s reading reasonable and not compelled otherwise |
| Whether federal and other-jurisdiction decisions require abandoning Smith | Otton cites federal circuits (e.g., Dietrich) and states (e.g., Florida) that limit “other proceeding” to formal, recorded proceedings | Majority: other authorities are split; numerous federal and state cases apply a totality/reliability approach; Washington is not so extreme to warrant overruling | Court holds other jurisdictions’ disagreement insufficient to overturn Smith |
| Whether Smith is harmful under stare decisis standards (incorrect + harmful) | Smith produces subjective, unreliable results and is at odds with Crawford and confrontation principles | Smith includes procedural safeguards (oath, penalty, cross-exam, four-factor test) and does not raise confrontation-clause problems; no evidence of inconsistent application | Court concludes Otton failed to show Smith is clearly incorrect and harmful; adheres to stare decisis |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Smith, 97 Wn.2d 856 (1982) (interpreted “other proceeding” in ER 801(d)(1)(i) via case-by-case reliability analysis)
- State v. Binh Thach, 126 Wn. App. 297 (2005) (articulated a four-factor test applying Smith)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause protects right to cross-examination; distinguishes evidentiary hearsay analysis from constitutional confrontation analysis)
- United States v. Dietrich, 854 F.2d 1056 (7th Cir. 1988) (held typical police interrogation is not an “other proceeding” under federal rule)
- United States v. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1976) (found an immigration interrogation analogous to a grand-jury-like proceeding and admissible under federal rule)
- In re Rights to Waters of Stranger Creek, 77 Wn.2d 649 (1970) (stare decisis requires a clear showing that precedent is incorrect and harmful)
- State v. Griffin, 173 Wn.2d 467 (2012) (standards for review of evidentiary rulings; rule interpretation is reviewed de novo)
