State v. Ortiz
2017 NMCA 6
| N.M. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Early morning police encounter: Officer Standridge responded to a suspicious-activity dispatch and found Ortiz jumping a fence near a closed business; she asked for identification and Ortiz refused to provide it.
- During a pat-down Officer Standridge discovered a temporary paper ID in Ortiz’s pocket; Ortiz was placed in the patrol car and taken to the station.
- At the station Ortiz became self-injurious and aggressive; he was tasered and restrained and later transported to the hospital by Officer Chavez with hands cuffed behind his back in the patrol car.
- Officer Chavez’s shotgun was unsecured and propped so the barrel was visible through an open partition; while at the hospital Ortiz grabbed the barrel with both handcuffed hands and attempted to pull it through the partition.
- Ortiz was charged with concealing identity (NMSA 30-22-3) and attempt to disarm a peace officer (NMSA 30-22-27(A) and NMSA 30-28-1); the district court convicted him after a bench trial and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Ortiz's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Officer Standridge was acting in a legal performance of duty (reasonable suspicion for the stop) | Standridge had reasonable suspicion based on dispatch and observing Ortiz repeatedly jumping a fence at 6:00 a.m. in a closed business area | The stop lacked the necessary reasonable suspicion; dispatch alone insufficient | Court held reasonable suspicion existed at inception based on observed conduct; stop was lawful and officer acted in legal performance of duty |
| Whether Ortiz concealed his identity under § 30-22-3 (element: concealment) | Ortiz refused to provide ID and misrepresented having none despite a paper ID in his pocket; refusal supports concealment | Ortiz claimed he gave his name and temporary ID; any delay was mere hesitation allowed by precedent | Court found sufficient evidence of concealment—factfinder discredited Ortiz’s testimony; refusal (not mere delay) satisfied the statute |
| Whether Ortiz had requisite intent/knowledge for attempt to disarm (§§ 30-22-27(A), 30-28-1) | Grabbing and trying to pull the shotgun through the partition while handcuffed is an overt act from which knowledge and intent to deprive use can be inferred | Ortiz claimed intoxication and that he grabbed objects to resist removal, not to disarm; may not have known it was a shotgun | Court held circumstantial evidence supported a finding Ortiz acted knowingly; voluntary intoxication was a factual matter for the factfinder and was rejected |
| Meaning of "depriving an officer of the use of a firearm" under § 30-22-27(A)(2) | The statute punishes depriving an officer of use generally (access/use as a noun); prevention of hypothetical future use suffices—no need to show the officer intended immediate use | Requirement should be interference with actual or probable use (officer must be about to use or need it) | Court interpreted "use" as a noun (access to weapon); interference with the officer’s use need not be actual or imminent—attempt satisfied by Ortiz’s actions |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (stop constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure)
- Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (plurality on limits of police questioning/detentions)
- State v. Dawson, 127 N.M. 472 (refusal/delay in giving identity and the permissible short hesitation rule)
- Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (interpretation of "use" in a firearms statute—federal context cited and distinguished)
- State v. Dowling, 150 N.M. 110 (circumstantial evidence can establish subjective knowledge and intent)