State v. Orn, 482 P.3d 913

Background

In August 2016 Nicholas Conan Orn went to Thomas Seamans’s garage and fired 11 shots; Seamans survived and was the State’s only testifying eyewitness. Orn was charged with attempted first-degree murder with a firearm and convicted; his defense was self‑defense.
Several months after the shooting Seamans entered a written agreement to work as a confidential informant for the Kent Police Department (KPD) in exchange for the Kirkland charges not being forwarded for prosecution.
At trial the court granted the State’s motion in limine and excluded evidence and questioning about the informant agreement under ER 403, but allowed one limited question: “Isn’t it true that since this incident, you have actually worked with Kent Police Department?”
Orn contended that excluding the nature and terms of the informant agreement (and permitting only the single vague question) violated his Sixth Amendment rights to confront witnesses and present a complete defense by preventing cross-examination that would reveal witness bias/motive.
The Court of Appeals affirmed; the Washington Supreme Court granted review, held that excluding detailed evidence of the informant agreement violated Orn’s confrontation/presentment rights and was an abuse of discretion, but that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Orn’s separate challenge to the to‑convict jury instruction for attempted first‑degree murder (alleging it failed to require premeditation) was rejected; the instructions taken together required premeditated intent.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Orn's Argument	Held
Whether excluding evidence and cross‑examination about Seamans’s informant agreement violated defendant’s confrontation and right-to-present-defense rights	Exclusion was proper under ER 403 to avoid unfair prejudice to KPD and ongoing investigations and to protect informant safety; permitted the single question to disclose some contact	Excluding the agreement and limiting cross to the single vague question hid the specific motive/leniency that could bias Seamans’s testimony and prevented meaningful impeachment	Exclusion of the proffered informant‑agreement evidence (beyond the single misleading question) violated Orn’s Sixth Amendment rights and was an abuse of discretion, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the entire record
Whether the to‑convict instruction for attempted 1st‑degree murder relieved the State of proving premeditation	Instruction need not restate elements of substantive crime because a separate definitional instruction on first‑degree murder (which includes premeditation) was given	Instruction should have explicitly required “premeditated intent” in the to‑convict elements	No error: the to‑convict instruction plus the separate definition of first‑degree murder properly required premeditated intent

Key Cases Cited

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (Cross‑examination to expose witness bias is constitutionally guaranteed)
Van Arsdall v. Delaware, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (Confrontation violations assessed under harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard)
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (Right to present a complete defense protects relevant exculpatory evidence)
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (Compulsory process and right to present witnesses and defense)
Darden, State v., 145 Wn.2d 612 (2002) (State interest in law enforcement must be balanced against confrontation/right to cross‑examine)
Hudlow, State v., 99 Wn.2d 1 (1983) (Three‑part test for excluding defense evidence: minimal relevance, unfair prejudice, State interest outweighs defendant’s need)
DeRyke, State v., 149 Wn.2d 906 (2003) (To‑convict instruction must contain essential elements of the attempt crime; substantive elements may be in a separate definitional instruction)
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (Impeachment where witness benefits from arrangements with prosecution)