364 P.3d 485
Ariz. Ct. App.2015Background
- Defendant Duane Okken was arrested for DUI after observable signs of intoxication and a preliminary breath test; he consented to a blood draw after being read Arizona’s implied-consent admonitions; blood showed 0.225% BAC.
- Okken moved to suppress the blood-test results on Fourth Amendment grounds and challenged the facial constitutionality of A.R.S. § 28-1321; city court denied suppression and found consent voluntary; superior court affirmed.
- Okken appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals, which had jurisdiction to decide only the statute’s facial validity, not its application to Okken.
- § 28-1321 creates an implied-consent framework: drivers give implied consent to testing when arrested for DUI, but subsection (B) requires an express, voluntary manifestation of consent post-arrest for a warrantless test; refusal triggers administrative license-suspension penalties and bars testing without a warrant.
- Okken argued § 28-1321 is facially unconstitutional under Missouri v. McNeely (exigency analysis) and the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine; he also invoked Camara.
- The court evaluated voluntariness under the totality of the circumstances and whether conditioning driving privileges on consent impermissibly coerced surrender of Fourth Amendment rights.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether McNeely renders § 28-1321 facially unconstitutional | Statute complies with Fourth Amendment because it requires consent or warrant | § 28-1321 effectively creates per se exigency or irrevocable implied consent contrary to McNeely | Not facially unconstitutional; McNeely clarified exigency analysis but does not invalidate statutes that require actual, voluntary consent evaluated under the totality of circumstances |
| Whether § 28-1321 impermissibly coerces consent under the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine | State: license is a privilege and suspensions are a legitimate, tailored regulatory response to refusals | Okken: conditioning driving privilege on consenting to searches forces surrender of Fourth Amendment rights | Not facially unconstitutional; penalties are closely related to state interest in roadway safety and are not unduly coercive |
| Whether Camara invalidates § 28-1321 | State: § 28-1321 requires probable cause and actual consent; unlike Camara it does not authorize warrantless administrative searches | Okken: analogizes refusal-penalty scheme to compelled administrative inspections addressed in Camara | Camara is distinguishable; administrative-warrant principles there do not control § 28-1321’s framework |
| Whether consent here must be analyzed case-by-case | State: statute allows testing when arrestee actually consents; voluntariness can be assessed | Okken: implied consent statute creates presumed consent or unavoidable coercion | Court: consent exception survives but voluntariness must be assessed under the totality of the circumstances (consistent with Butler and McNeely) |
Key Cases Cited
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (U.S. 2013) (metabolization of alcohol does not create automatic exigency; exigency and consent must be assessed case-by-case)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (U.S. 1966) (warrantless blood draw upheld where exigent circumstances threatened loss of evidence)
- State v. Butler, 232 Ariz. 84 (Ariz. 2013) (consent to blood draw must be voluntary under the totality of circumstances despite implied-consent statute)
- State v. Quinn, 218 Ariz. 66 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (legislature cannot impute implied consent to validate otherwise unconstitutional warrantless searches)
- South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (U.S. 1983) (license-revocation penalties for refusal to take BAC test are legitimate; refusal inference not protected by Fifth Amendment)
- Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (U.S. 1967) (administrative inspections generally require an administrative warrant; not analogous to § 28-1321 here)