State v. Ochoa
2017 NMSC 31
| N.M. | 2017Background
- Defendant John Eric Ochoa was arrested May 12, 2008 on multiple sexual-offense charges and remained continuously incarcerated until conviction after retrial May 17–20, 2010 (≈ 2 years pretrial).
- Multiple trial settings were vacated for varied reasons: holiday/calendar errors, defense continuance to review newly disclosed witness interviews, pending motions, judge’s family death, and a governor-ordered one-day public-defender furlough that affected defense support staff.
- A mistrial occurred on March 8, 2010 (juror comment); retrial occurred two months later. The State filed three six‑month extension petitions under Rule 5‑604(B); the district court granted each. Defendant filed five speedy-trial demands and four motions to dismiss but did not substantively respond to the State’s extension petitions.
- The New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed the convictions on speedy-trial grounds, reasoning that the lengthy (continuous) pretrial incarceration—longer than 22 months in precedent—was prejudicial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- The Supreme Court applied the Barker v. Wingo four-factor balancing test (length, reason, assertion, prejudice), presumed some prejudice from continuous two‑year incarceration but held that length, reasons for delay, and defendant’s assertion did not weigh heavily in defendant’s favor and reversed the Court of Appeals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Ochoa) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the length and reasons for pretrial delay weighed against the State | Delay not extraordinary; many postponements were neutral or administrative; State moved diligently; weight against State is slight | Two‑year total delay (continuous incarceration) is prejudicial and weighs for dismissal | Court: Length triggered analysis but only slightly weighed against State; reasons largely neutral/administrative; factor does not tip balance to defendant |
| Whether continuous pretrial incarceration ≈22+ months alone permits presumption of particularized prejudice when defendant offered no affirmative proof | No bright‑line presumption; defendant must generally show particularized prejudice; presumptive prejudice cannot by itself carry claim | 22+ months of continuous incarceration is presumptively prejudicial and can satisfy prejudice factor absent detailed proof | Court: Presumed some prejudice from two years’ continuous incarceration, but presumption is not dispositive and did not overcome other Barker factors |
| Whether the one‑day public‑defender furlough constitutes a "systemic breakdown" attributable to the State | Furlough is a state action and delay resulting from it should weigh against State | Furlough impaired defense support and justified continuance; delay should be neutral or weigh against State | Court: Furlough was institutional but not a debilitating, systemic breakdown; delay treated as neutral (not charged to State) |
| Effect of mistrial on speedy‑trial "clock" (whether clock resets) | Retrial within reasonable time is required; court should not treat mistrial as resetting full statutory guideline anew | Retrial within guideline should be acceptable; Court of Appeals’ reliance on post‑mistrial timing was incorrect | Court: Rejected bright‑line "reset clock" and "not a trial" approaches; post‑mistrial retrial must occur within a reasonable time—two months here was reasonable |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (establishes four‑factor speedy‑trial balancing test)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (U.S. 1992) (excessive delay can give rise to presumptive prejudice because some harm is unprovable)
- Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81 (U.S. 2009) (delays by defense counsel ordinarily attributable to defendant; exception for systemic public‑defender breakdown)
- State v. Garza, 212 P.3d 387 (N.M. 2009) (New Mexico guidelines and approach to weighing length and prejudice; no bright‑line thresholds)
- State v. Serros, 366 P.3d 1121 (N.M. 2016) (lengthy pretrial incarceration can be "oppressive on its face" and reduce defendant’s burden to show particularized prejudice)
