State v. Obas, 320 Conn. 426

Background

Defendant Mycall Obas pleaded guilty (Dec. 11, 2003) to sexual assault in the second degree for conduct when he was 18 and the victim was 15; plea included a recommendation of 10 years (execution suspended after 9 months) and ten years’ probation with special conditions, including a mandatory ten‑year sex‑offender registration.
No agreement in the plea that defendant would never seek modification of probation or never apply for statutory exemption from registration; the court accepted the plea and imposed the agreed conditions.
After release in 2004 defendant began registering, completed treatment, violated probation once (2005) only to receive two more years added, then complied, completed education, maintained employment, and had no further criminal conduct.
In 2011 defendant moved to modify probation and to be exempted from continued registration under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54‑251(b); psychosexual evaluation and probation reports indicated low risk of reoffense and recommended no objection.
Trial court (after contested hearings) granted exemption under § 54‑251(b) (finding defendant was under 19 at offense and registration not required for public safety) and modified limited conditions; state appealed and Appellate Court affirmed; this appeal followed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Obas)	Held
Whether § 54‑251(b) permits a court to grant an exemption from sex‑offender registration after the registration obligation has commenced	§ 54‑251(b) should be read to allow exemption only before the registration obligation commences (e.g., at sentencing); no temporal language in (b) does not authorize post‑registration exemption	§ 54‑251(b)’s “may exempt” is broad; right to seek exemption vests on conviction and continues during registration, so courts may exempt even after registration begins	Court held § 54‑251(b) authorizes a court to exempt a qualifying individual at any time after conviction, including after registration has commenced, provided statutory criteria are met
Whether a plea agreement that required the defendant to register for ten years barred him from later filing an application for exemption under § 54‑251(b)	The plea term requiring ten years’ registration was a bargained‑for promise and should preclude the defendant from later seeking statutory exemption—allowing exemption undermines plea bargaining	The plea did not explicitly waive the statutory right to seek exemption; ambiguous plea terms must be construed against the state; mere agreement to the statutory minimum registration term does not unambiguously relinquish the statutory right to apply for exemption	Court held the plea term was ambiguous on waiver of the § 54‑251(b) right; ambiguity construed against the state, so defendant was not barred from seeking exemption

Key Cases Cited

State v. Rivers, 283 Conn. 713, 931 A.2d 185 (2007) (ambiguous plea‑agreement terms construed against the state; court will not read in implied obligations such as testifying)
State v. Bletsch, 281 Conn. 5, 912 A.2d 992 (2007) (interpretation of § 54‑251(b) — “may exempt” is discretionary; even if criteria met court may deny exemption)
State v. Revelo, 256 Conn. 494, 775 A.2d 260 (2001) (importance of plea bargaining fairness and due process in interpreting plea agreements)
Wilkins v. Connecticut Childbirth & Women’s Center, 314 Conn. 709, 104 A.3d 671 (2014) (statutes should be interpreted to avoid absurd or unworkable results)
United States v. Podde, 105 F.3d 813 (2d Cir. 1997) (ambiguous plea agreements should not be read to imply waivers in favor of the government)
Innes v. Dalsheim, 864 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1988) (refusal to read ambiguous plea term as imposing an unexpressed waiver such as waiver of jury trial)