State v. Nunez
2016 Ohio 812
Ohio Ct. App.2016Background
- Victor Nunez was convicted in 2009 of multiple sex‑related offenses (three rape counts, two kidnapping counts, aggravated burglary, intimidation) and originally sentenced to an aggregate 22‑year term.
- This court in State v. Nunez (Nunez I) held certain rape/kidnapping convictions were allied and remanded for resentencing.
- At the December 28, 2010 resentencing, the state elected to merge the kidnapping counts into two rape counts; the trial court again imposed an aggregate 22‑year sentence, with specific counts ordered consecutive or concurrent as announced and in the journal entry, and imposed postrelease control and sex‑offender classification.
- Nunez later obtained federal habeas relief permitting a delayed appeal; he raised claims attacking the trial court’s consecutive‑sentence findings, an asserted journal/ oral‑pronouncement inconsistency, alleged merger of multiple rape counts, and ineffective assistance at resentencing.
- The court limited review to matters properly before it on remand (state’s election and subsequent sentencing) and affirmed the resentencing in full.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Nunez) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether R.C. 2929.14(C) findings were required for consecutive sentences at the 2010 resentencing | H.B.86 requirements for express consecutive‑sentence findings are not applicable because resentencing occurred before the statute’s effective date; post‑Foster judges had discretion to impose consecutive terms | Court erred by not making the specific findings required under the post‑H.B.86 statute | Court: H.B.86 inapplicable to this 2010 resentencing; Foster removed the earlier findings requirement; claim overruled |
| Whether Count 11’s sentence was ambiguous or improperly journaled/ not pronounced | Trial court’s oral statements and journal entry consistently reflect intent to preserve the original aggregate/consecutive structure; no ambiguity | Sentence on Count 11 should run concurrently with Count 8 or was not pronounced in open court as reflected in journal | Court: No ambiguity; oral pronouncement and journal are consistent; consecutive terms upheld |
| Whether Counts 8 and 9 (two rape counts against the same victim) were allied and required merger | State contends only rape and kidnapping were found allied in Nunez I and on remand merged kidnapping into rape per the court’s direction; different sexual acts can be separate offenses | Nunez argues Nunez I found the rape counts were allied and should merge into one conviction | Court: Nunez I addressed merger of rape with kidnapping only; different sexual acts (oral vs. vaginal) are distinct offenses; no merger of the two rape counts warranted |
| Whether counsel was ineffective at resentencing for failing to argue merger of Counts 8, 9, 10 | State: Resentencing scope limited to state’s election and merger of rape/kidnapping; counsel’s performance was not deficient and no prejudice shown | Counsel should have argued the rape counts and kidnapping were all allied and merged, which could have reduced sentence | Court: No deficient performance or prejudice shown; ineffective‑assistance claim fails |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Foster, 845 N.E.2d 470 (Ohio 2006) (severed statutory consecutive‑sentence findings and restored judicial discretion within statutory ranges)
- Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (U.S. 2009) (held Sixth Amendment did not prohibit States from assigning consecutive‑sentence factfinding to judges in some circumstances)
- State v. Hodge, 941 N.E.2d 768 (Ohio 2010) (Ice did not revive the severed consecutive‑sentence statutory provisions absent legislative action)
- State v. Bonnell, 16 N.E.3d 659 (Ohio 2014) (discussed post‑H.B.86 requirements for on‑the‑record findings when imposing consecutive sentences)
- State v. Wilson, 951 N.E.2d 381 (Ohio 2011) (limits on appellate review after partial remand; sentencing hearing scope post‑remand)
- State v. Saxon, 846 N.E.2d 824 (Ohio 2006) (consecutive sentencing considerations after separate terms are imposed)
- State v. Perez, 920 N.E.2d 104 (Ohio 2009) (Strickland/Bradley standards for ineffective‑assistance claims)
