State v. Northcutt
2015 MT 267
Mont.2015Background
- Peter Northcutt was tried in Carbon County for three counts of assault on a peace officer and one count of aggravated animal cruelty; jury deliberated April 2013 and returned guilty on the three assault counts and not guilty on the animal-cruelty count.
- While the jury deliberated and after it had asked two notes (one requesting an exhibit and one requesting a transcript), District Judge Loren Tucker approached the jury room and asked whether they would finish that night; the interaction occurred without Northcutt, his counsel, the prosecutor, or the court reporter present.
- Juror and bailiff affidavits (and live testimony at a hearing) confirmed the judge’s brief inquiry; one juror felt it was an instruction to finish that evening, though no witness testified the judge told jurors to finish.
- Northcutt moved for a new trial asserting violation of his right to be present and right to a public trial; the district court denied the motion and Northcutt appealed.
- The Supreme Court of Montana reviewed de novo, found the absence did violate Northcutt’s right to be present but that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the record; it also held the public-trial infringement was trivial.
Issues
| Issue | Northcutt’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether judge’s ex parte contact with deliberating jury without defendant present violated defendant’s right to be present | Tapson requires automatic reversal when a judge enters jury room without defendant/counsel and no on‑the‑record waiver | Entry/interrogation was brief, administrative, and recorded; presence error is subject to harmless‑error analysis | The contact violated right to be present, but error was harmless (not structural) because record showed only a brief administrative inquiry and no instruction to finish |
| Whether juror affidavits about the contact were admissible | Juror affidavits recounting the judge’s communication should be considered to evaluate prejudice | Rule 606(b) limits juror testimony about deliberations, but permits testimony about outside influence | Juror affidavits were admissible under M. R. Evid. 606(b)(2) because the judge’s communication was an outside influence on deliberations |
| Whether the presence violation required automatic reversal or harmless‑error review | Tapson’s language of automatic reversal controls | Tapson’s automatic reversal applied where no record existed; here there is a record allowing harmless‑error review | Tapson does not compel automatic reversal because a record exists; harmless‑error standard applies (State must show no reasonable possibility of prejudice) |
| Whether the judge’s contact violated the public‑trial right | Judge’s private approach closed part of the trial to public and implicated public‑trial protections | Interaction was brief, administrative, post‑evidence, placed on the record, and not deliberately secretive | Infringement on public‑trial right was trivial given scope, duration, context, and recordation |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522 (1985) (defendant’s right to be present and limits on ex parte judge‑juror contacts)
- Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (public‑trial right and circumstances when closure is structural)
- Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (public‑trial presumption and when closure may be justified)
- State v. Tapson, 41 P.3d 305 (Mont. 2001) (prior Montana rule treating judge entry into jury room during deliberations as reversible error where no record)
- State v. Matt, 199 P.3d 244 (Mont. 2008) (right to be present and harmless‑error framework)
- State v. Charlie, 239 P.3d 934 (Mont. 2010) (standards for reviewing presence and public‑trial claims)