State v. Norris, 213 Conn.App. 253

Background

On April 14, 2018 defendant Jahmon Hakeem Norris allegedly violently assaulted his girlfriend (T.) in her apartment in front of her six‑year‑old daughter (I.), including biting, strangulation, spitting, ripping clothes, and causing bleeding; police were called and arrested Norris.
After arrest Norris was taken to St. Mary’s Hospital, became agitated, threw himself from a stretcher and bit a hospital patient care assistant (Pages); separate criminal charges were filed for the apartment incident and the hospital incident.
A 2018 competency evaluation found Norris competent and a competency hearing then confirmed competency. Nearly a year later, on the morning jury selection began (Nov. 6, 2019), Norris repeatedly disrupted proceedings and claimed he did not understand the process; defense counsel moved for a new competency evaluation.
The trial court reviewed the earlier competency report, engaged in extended colloquy with Norris, observed his demeanor and disruptive behavior, concluded Norris was manipulating the process, and denied a new competency evaluation. The court also granted the state’s motion to join the two informations for trial.
At trial Norris admitted the hospital conduct (throwing himself off the stretcher and biting) but claimed self‑defense; the jury convicted on some counts (risk of injury to a child, assault in the third degree, breach of the peace, interfering with an officer) and acquitted on others. Norris was sentenced and appealed.
On appeal Norris challenged (1) the adequacy of the court’s independent inquiry before denying a competency evaluation and (2) joinder of the two informations as prejudicial given the more brutal domestic violence allegations.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Norris's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a competency evaluation / failing to conduct an adequate independent inquiry	The court permissibly relied on the prior competency report and its own contemporaneous observations and dialogues with Norris; counsel’s assertions were vague and did not present specific factual allegations raising substantial evidence of incompetence	The court ignored Dort precedent, failed to canvass Norris properly, and erroneously relied on a stale report rather than ordering a new competency hearing	Court affirmed: no abuse of discretion — defense offered only vague assertions, the court reviewed the prior report, had extensive colloquy and observations, and reasonably concluded Norris was competent and attempting delay
Whether joinder of the domestic violence and hospital informations was improper and prejudicial	Joinder was proper: incidents were discrete, not unusually shocking, and consolidation promoted efficiency; jury instructions could cure any risk of prejudice	Joinder was improper under the second Boscarino factor because the domestic violence conduct was substantially more brutal/shocking than the hospital incident and risked propensity prejudice; jury instructions were insufficient	Mixed: court erred on the Boscarino second‑factor (joinder improper) but any prejudice was cured by repeated, specific jury instructions to consider each count/information separately; conviction affirmed

Key Cases Cited

State v. Dort, 315 Conn. 151 (2014) (trial court must order competency hearing when defense counsel presents fact‑laden allegations that, if true, constitute substantial evidence of incompetence)
State v. Boscarino, 204 Conn. 714 (1987) (factors for joinder/severance include distinctness of scenarios, shocking/violent nature, and trial complexity)
State v. Jordan, 151 Conn. App. 1 (2014) (competency motions reviewed for abuse of discretion; courts may rely on prior reports plus in‑court observations)
State v. McKethan, 184 Conn. App. 187 (2018) (curative jury instructions can cure joinder prejudice when risk is not overwhelming)
State v. Payne, 303 Conn. 538 (2012) (compare relative violence across informations when assessing Boscarino second factor)
State v. Ellis, 270 Conn. 337 (2004) (joinder improper where abuse in one case was substantially more egregious than in another)
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (federal standard for competency: ability to consult with counsel with a rational and factual understanding of proceedings)