State v. Nollen, 296 Neb. 94

Background

In 1983, Dale V. Nollen (age 17) pled guilty to first-degree murder after participating in the abduction, sexual assault, and death of Mary Jo Hovendick and was sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment.
Following Miller v. Alabama and related developments, Nollen obtained postconviction relief; his original life-without-parole sentence was vacated and a resentencing occurred in January 2016.
At resentencing the court received evidence of Nollen’s adverse childhood, impulsivity and neurodevelopmental immaturity (psychologist Dr. Newring), details of the offense and Nollen’s confession, and extensive record evidence of institutional rehabilitation over 33 years.
The district court expressly acknowledged Nollen’s youth and mitigating factors but found significant premeditation and the heinous, terrorizing manner of the offense as aggravating.
The court resentenced Nollen to 90 years to life; the parties then litigated which good-time law applies (affecting parole eligibility age). The Court of Appeals/Nebraska Supreme Court resolved the appeal.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Nollen)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Which good-time law applies to parole eligibility	Current good-time law should apply because original 1983 sentence was void after Miller; parole eligibility should be earlier	Original (1983) good-time law applies; sentence finality dates control	Court: Original sentence was void; the new sentence becomes final on appellate mandate, so current good-time law applies (parole eligibility at age 62)
Whether resentenced term (90 years–life) is effectively life without parole in violation of Eighth/14th Amendments	Sentence is a de facto life term denying meaningful opportunity for release under Graham/Miller	Sentence considered youth-related mitigators; felony-murder is a homicide and Miller governs; sentence allows parole eligibility	Court: Sentence complies with Miller (court considered youth factors); not unconstitutional
Whether sentence is grossly disproportionate	Nollen: sentence disproportionate given age, developmental characteristics, demonstrated rehabilitation	State: offense was brutal, protracted abduction/sexual assault leading to death; severe sentence justified	Court: Not grossly disproportionate under Eighth Amendment given facts of offense; claim denied
Whether sentencing court failed to give meaningful consideration/process regarding youth characteristics (due process)	Sentencing judge did not make specific findings required by Miller (e.g., on intent to kill, irreparable corruption)	Judge expressly acknowledged age, science, family background and considered mitigating and aggravating factors under §28-105.02	Court: Procedural protections were adequate; judge meaningfully considered age-related characteristics and mitigation; no new procedural safeguards required

Key Cases Cited

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment and sentencers must account for youth)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders forbidden; juveniles must have meaningful opportunity for release)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (sentences in violation of substantive constitutional rules are void and must be made retroactive)
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (Eighth Amendment forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate)
State v. Smith, 295 Neb. 957 (Neb. 2017) (void juvenile LWOP sentences mean no sentence; current good-time law applied on resentencing)
State v. Mantich, 295 Neb. 407 (Neb. 2016) (felony murder treated as homicide for Eighth Amendment sentencing analysis; Miller applied)
State v. Schrein, 247 Neb. 256 (1995) (good-time law applicable is the law in effect when sentence becomes final unless sentence was void)
Duff v. Clarke, 247 Neb. 345 (1995) (distinguishable precedent on which good-time law applies when original sentence was valid)