State v. Nollen, 892 N.W.2d 81

Background

In 1983, 17‑year‑old Dale V. Nollen pled guilty to first‑degree murder (felony‑murder facts) and received a mandatory life sentence; that sentence was later vacated under Miller v. Alabama.
Following postconviction relief, the district court ordered a presentence report and a comprehensive 2015 mental‑health exam; resentencing occurred in January 2016.
Evidence at resentencing: abusive, alcoholic family background; impulsive adolescent behavior; detailed confession describing abduction, sexual assault, and terrorizing of victim before her death; and extensive institutional rehabilitation (education, programs, positive correctional staff testimony).
Dr. Kirk Newring’s 2015 report emphasized juvenile neurodevelopment, impulsivity, adverse childhood experiences, and assessed low risk for future violent reoffense.
The district court acknowledged youth and mitigating factors but emphasized premeditation and the prolonged terrorizing of the victim and sentenced Nollen to 90 years to life; parties litigated which good‑time law governs parole eligibility.
The Nebraska Supreme Court concluded the original 1983 sentence was void (per Miller/Montgomery), applied the current good‑time law (making parole eligibility at age 62), and affirmed the 90‑years‑to‑life resentencing.

Issues

Issue	Nollen's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Applicable good‑time law for parole eligibility	Current law should apply because original 1983 life sentence was void under Miller; resentencing finality is now	Original sentence became final in 1983; earlier good‑time law applies (Duff)	Court: original sentence was void; finality occurs on entry of new mandate; current good‑time law applies (parole eligibility at 62)
Whether the 90‑yr‑to‑life sentence is a de facto life without parole in violation of Eighth/14th Amendments (Miller/Graham)	Sentence is unconstitutional as effectively life without meaningful opportunity for release given parole calculations	Sentence complied with Miller: court considered youth, mitigating factors, and sentenced to a term allowing parole eligibility	Court: sentence does not violate Miller/Graham; sentencing court considered youth and mitigating factors; Miller procedures satisfied
Proportionality of sentence given age, characteristics, and rehabilitation	90 years is grossly disproportionate in light of juvenile status and evidence of reform	Given the brutal, prolonged nature of the crime, sentence is not grossly disproportionate	Court: Eighth Amendment forbids only extreme gross disproportionality; given facts (abduction, sexual assault, terror, death) sentence is not disproportionate
Procedural protection at resentencing (need for specific findings re: intent, irreparable corruption)	Court failed to demonstrate ‘‘meaningful consideration’’ of age‑related characteristics and should be required to make explicit findings	Existing sentencing process (consideration of §28‑105.02 factors and judge’s observations) suffices under Miller	Court: adequate consideration shown on the record; declines to impose additional procedural findings beyond current practice

Key Cases Cited

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment; sentencers must consider youth‑related factors)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders barred; juveniles must have meaningful opportunity for release)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (sentences in violation of substantive constitutional rules are void; Miller is retroactive)
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (Eighth Amendment proportionality standard forbids only grossly disproportionate sentences)
State v. Smith, 295 Neb. 957 (Neb. 2017) (held that a void juvenile life sentence is no sentence for finality/good‑time purposes)
State v. Mantich, 295 Neb. 407 (Neb. 2016) (felony murder treated as a homicide offense for Eighth Amendment sentencing analysis)
State v. Schrein, 247 Neb. 256 (1995) (good‑time law applies as of the date a sentence becomes final)
Duff v. Clarke, 247 Neb. 345 (1995) (good‑time law applicable when original sentence is valid and final)