State v. Nix, 334 P.3d 437

Defendant owned dozens of emaciated animals; police found many suffering and several carcasses on his farm.
Indicted on multiple counts (23 first-degree, 70 second-degree); jury convicted defendant of 20 counts of second-degree animal neglect (ORS 167.325).
Trial court merged the 20 guilty verdicts into one conviction, reasoning that "victim" in the anti-merger statute (ORS 161.067(2)) means persons only.
State appealed; Court of Appeals reversed, holding animals may be "victims" under the anti-merger statute.
Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals: the meaning of "victim" for ORS 161.067(2) is determined by the underlying substantive statute, and under ORS 167.325 the individual animal suffers the harm that is an element of the offense.
Judgment reversed as to merger; case remanded for entry of separate convictions on each guilty verdict and for resentencing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Nix)	Held
Whether "victims" in ORS 161.067(2) can include non-human animals, permitting separate convictions for each animal neglected	"Victim" meaning derives from the underlying substantive statute; ORS 167.325 focuses on individual animals and their suffering, so each animal is a victim.	Ordinary meaning of "victim" refers only to persons; animals are property under Oregon law, so animals cannot be "victims" for anti-merger purposes.	Animals can be "victims" under ORS 161.067(2) when the substantive offense (ORS 167.325) treats the animal as suffering harm that is an element of the crime; trial court erred in merging convictions.

State v. Glaspey, 337 Or 558 (2004) ("victim" under anti-merger provision is defined by the substantive criminal statute)
State v. Hamilton, 348 Or 371 (2010) (interpreting who qualifies as a victim under the substantive robbery statute for anti-merger analysis)
State v. Crotsley, 308 Or 272 (1989) (legislative history and enactment background of anti-merger provisions)