State v. Nissley
362 P.3d 493
Ariz. Ct. App.2015Background
- On Nov. 2, 2010 Patrick Nissley crashed at high speed, killing a pedestrian and injuring others; he was taken from the scene to a hospital where medical staff drew blood showing methamphetamine and a heroin metabolite.
- No search warrant was obtained for the blood; the State relied on A.R.S. § 28-1388(E) (medical-purpose exception) to supply law enforcement with a portion of blood taken for medical reasons.
- Nissley moved to suppress the blood results, arguing he expressly refused medical treatment and thus the medical-purpose exception did not apply (relying on State v. Estrada).
- An evidentiary hearing produced testimony from first responders and medical personnel about Nissley’s combative, profane, and noncooperative conduct, but no clear, unambiguous statement refusing treatment on the record.
- The superior court denied suppression (finding no clear/express refusal and that police had probable cause); a jury convicted Nissley of reckless manslaughter, drug possession/use, and endangerment; sentence modified on appeal to vacate a DNA fee charge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether police had probable cause to believe a DUI under A.R.S. § 28-1381 occurred before blood draw | Probable cause was lacking because alternative explanations (medical emergency) and inconsistent testimony undermine an objective finding | Police collective knowledge (erratic driving, syringes, behavior, physical evidence) provided reasonably trustworthy information supporting probable cause | Probable cause existed; superior court’s finding affirmed (deferential review of factual credibility) |
| Whether Nissley expressly/unambiguously refused medical treatment so that § 28-1388(E) cannot apply (Estrada standard) | Nissley argued he repeatedly said “leave me alone,” refused transport and treatment, and thus clearly rejected care per Estrada | State argued his statements/behavior were ambiguous (delirium, pain, inability to meaningfully refuse) and no unambiguous refusal was proven; no police coercion at hospital | Court held the State met its burden: the record did not show an unambiguous, clear, and express refusal; medical-purpose exception applied and suppression denial was not an abuse of discretion |
| Whether police or medical personnel coerced transport/treatment (Spencer concern) | Nissley contended any submission was coerced and analogous to Spencer where officer ultimatum made hospital choice involuntary | State showed no officer ultimatum or police-directed transport/blood draw; hospital acted under medical protocol | No evidence of police coercion or ultimatum; Spencer concerns inapplicable here |
| Whether sentencing order requiring defendant to pay DNA testing cost was authorized | Nissley argued fee unauthorized | State sought to impose fee | Sentence modified to vacate DNA testing cost per State v. Reyes; otherwise convictions and sentences affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Estrada, 209 Ariz. 287 (App. 2004) (medical-purpose exception does not apply when person clearly and expressly rejects medical treatment)
- State v. Spencer, 235 Ariz. 496 (App. 2014) (State bears burden to show exception applies; discusses coerced consent under facts like Spencer)
- State v. Aleman, 210 Ariz. 232 (App. 2005) (probable cause standard for DUI: probability, not prima facie showing)
- State v. Cocio, 147 Ariz. 277 (1985) (statutory medical-purpose exception applies only where blood was drawn by medical personnel for medical reasons)
- State v. Reyes, 232 Ariz. 468 (App. 2013) (court cannot impose DNA testing cost on convicted defendant)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) (natural dissipation of alcohol does not categorically create exigency to bypass warrant requirement)
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (Fourth Amendment’s preference for searches pursuant to a warrant)