State v. Nicol.
140 Haw. 482
| Haw. | 2017Background
- Donald Nicol was indicted in First Circuit Court on multiple sexual-assault counts and pleaded not guilty; trial was delayed repeatedly and Nicol sometimes waived speedy-trial rights.
- Nicol moved to dismiss under HRPP Rule 48 (six-month rule) and sought dismissal with prejudice under the three-factor Estencion test; the circuit court found a Rule 48 violation and dismissed the indictment without prejudice.
- Nicol appealed the dismissal to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA). The State argued the ICA lacked jurisdiction because HRS § 641-11 labels the "sentence" as the "judgment," and no sentence had been imposed.
- The ICA dismissed Nicol’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, concluding there was no appealable "judgment" under HRS § 641-11.
- The Hawai‘i Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a circuit-court defendant may appeal an order dismissing proceedings without prejudice under HRS § 641-11.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a circuit-court defendant may appeal an order dismissing proceedings without prejudice under HRS § 641-11 | State: § 641-11 requires a "sentence" as the "judgment," so no appeal exists where no sentence was imposed | Nicol: § 641-11 should be read in context; courts focus on finality and district defendants may appeal dismissals, so circuit defendants must too | Court held: A circuit-court defendant may appeal an order dismissing proceedings without prejudice under HRS § 641-11 (vacated ICA dismissal) |
| Whether the clause "The sentence... shall be the judgment" limits scope of appealable orders | State: clause shows legislature intended "judgment" = sentence, so only sentences are appealable | Nicol: legislative history shows the clause was meant to fix timing, not narrow scope; finality governs appealability | Held: Clause addresses timing; appealability governed by finality, not strictly by existence of a sentence |
| Whether HRS §§ 641-11 and 641-12 should be read differently as to dismissal appeals | State: textual difference implies different rights for circuit vs district defendants | Nicol: in pari materia and legislative history show no intent to deny circuit defendants a parallel right; anomalous to treat similarly situated defendants differently | Held: Statutes construed in pari materia; denying circuit defendants the right would be unreasonable—circuit defendants may appeal final dismissals |
| Whether interlocutory appeal or supervisory jurisdiction are necessary here | State: defendant could have sought interlocutory review under § 641-17 | Nicol: § 641-17 addresses interlocutory denials, not grants that terminate proceedings | Held: Not necessary to resolve—court decides § 641-11 provides jurisdiction and remands to ICA for merits |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Estencion, 63 Haw. 264, 625 P.2d 1040 (Haw. 1981) (articulated three-factor test for dismissal with prejudice)
- State v. Johnston, 63 Haw. 9, 619 P.2d 1076 (Haw. 1980) (denial of motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable under § 641-11)
- State v. Ui, 66 Haw. 366, 663 P.2d 630 (Haw. 1983) (discussed appealability under § 641-11 and finality)
- State v. Kalani, 87 Haw. 260, 953 P.2d 1358 (Haw. 1998) (State may appeal dismissals without prejudice; orders granting dismissal are final)
- State v. Kealaiki, 95 Haw. 309, 22 P.3d 588 (Haw. 2001) (order granting deferred plea pending conditions is not final and not appealable under § 641-11)
- State v. Ferreira, 54 Haw. 485, 510 P.2d 88 (Haw. 1973) (appeal not permitted where judgment was not final)
- State v. Lawrence, [citation="139 Hawai'i 192, 386 P.3d 476"] (App. 2016) (judgment of acquittal and commitment treated as a "sentence" for § 641-11 due to finality concerns)