State v. Newton, 466 P.3d 135

At ~3:00 a.m. after a party, Brian Newton and M.F. left together; M.F. alleges Newton forcibly raped her in his car; Newton claims the sex was consensual and initiated by M.F.
A rape exam showed extensive injuries (genital trauma, bruising, neck petechia and tenderness consistent with strangulation); M.F. left her cell phone in Newton’s car and it was later recovered about 18 months after the incident.
At trial the court instructed the jury: “Rape means the actor knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly has sexual intercourse with another without that person’s consent.” Defense counsel did not object; jury convicted Newton of aggravated sexual assault and aggravated assault.
After conviction Newton obtained new counsel and moved for a new trial alleging (1) ineffective assistance for failing to object to the rape jury instruction, and (2) a Brady violation because the State did not perform a pretrial forensic exam of M.F.’s phone.
The district court ordered a posttrial forensic exam; it found a contact entry for Newton at 3:09 a.m. and text/call activity corroborating friends’ attempts to reach M.F. The district court denied the new-trial motion; the court of appeals affirmed; the Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Newton)	Held
Whether defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the rape jury instruction	Jury instruction was legally adequate and any ambiguity would not have changed the verdict given the evidence	Instruction arguably misstated mens rea for nonconsent; failure to object was deficient and prejudicial because consent was the sole contested element	No ineffective assistance: even if instruction was ambiguous, Newton was not prejudiced because evidence (victim’s resistance and injuries) overwhelmingly supported nonconsent
Whether the State violated Brady by not performing a pretrial forensic exam of the victim’s cell phone and whether posttrial phone evidence was material	Prosecutor had no duty to search or test evidence when no government actor knew the phone contained favorable, material evidence; posttrial phone data was not material to guilt	The State had an affirmative Brady duty to forensically examine the phone; phone data (contact entry) would have impeached or undermined M.F.’s testimony about prior animus and provided circumstantial evidence of consent	No Brady violation: State did not suppress evidence (no duty to test absent apparent exculpatory value) and the phone findings were not material because they were ambiguous and corroborated victim’s testimony rather than undermined it

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutorial disclosure duty and suppression test)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (prosecutor must learn of favorable evidence known to government agents)
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (no due process violation for failure to perform tests absent bad faith or apparent exculpatory value)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (materiality standard for Brady: reasonable probability of a different result)
State v. Barela, 349 P.3d 676 (Utah 2015) (counsel deficient for failing to object to rape instruction that failed to require mens rea as to victim’s nonconsent)
State v. Marchet, 219 P.3d 75 (Utah Ct. App. 2009) (upheld rape instruction where mens rea reasonably applied to all elements)
State v. Beverly, 435 P.3d 160 (Utah 2018) (discusses prejudice inquiry for ineffective-assistance claims)