State v. Nelson, 437 P.3d 127

In May 2017 Nelson pleaded guilty to felony criminal possession of dangerous drugs; parties agreed to jointly recommend a two-year deferred sentence if she was eligible, otherwise a two-year suspended sentence.
Nelson had a 2015 Arizona conviction for second-degree escape, classified in Arizona as a class five felony with a maximum potential two-year prison term; Arizona imposed 17 days jail and one year supervised probation, which Nelson completed.
Montana law, § 46-18-201(1)(b), bars deferral of a sentence in a felony case if the offender was previously "convicted of a felony on a prior occasion, whether or not the sentence was imposed, imposition of the sentence was deferred, or execution of the sentence was suspended."
The parties disputed whether Nelson’s Arizona conviction counted as a prior "felony" under § 46-18-201(1)(b): Nelson argued felony status should depend on the sentence actually imposed; the State argued it should depend on the prior offense’s maximum potential sentence.
The District Court agreed with the State, ruled Nelson’s Arizona conviction was a prior felony under § 46-18-201(1)(b) and therefore ineligible for a deferred sentence, and imposed the agreed two-year suspended sentence.
Nelson appealed; the Montana Supreme Court reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and affirmed the District Court.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Nelson)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether a prior conviction qualifies as a "felony" under § 46-18-201(1)(b) based on the sentence actually imposed or the offense's maximum potential sentence	A prior conviction is a felony only if the sentence actually imposed was death or imprisonment over one year	A prior conviction is a felony if the prior offense’s maximum potential statutory sentence was death or imprisonment over one year	The statute uses the prior offense’s maximum potential sentence to classify a prior conviction as a felony for § 46-18-201(1)(b); Nelson’s Arizona conviction was a disqualifying prior felony

State v. Webb, 325 Mont. 317, 106 P.3d 521 (2005) (standard: courts review criminal sentences for legality and defer to district court sentencing discretion)
State v. Hastings, 340 Mont. 1, 171 P.3d 726 (2007) (statutory interpretation begins with plain language)
State v. Brendal, 351 Mont. 395, 213 P.3d 448 (2009) (courts harmonize statutes and give effect to each when possible)