State v. Neal
161 Wash. App. 111
Wash. Ct. App.2011Background
- Neal was convicted of residential burglary after entering a tool room in an apartment building with intent to commit a crime.
- Neal possessed a stolen credit card and crack cocaine when apprehended, reinforcing his criminal conduct.
- The key issue is whether the tool room constitutes a dwelling under RCW 9A.52.025(1) given it is within a residential building but not inhabited.
- The State argued the apartment building itself is a dwelling, not necessarily the tool room, to sustain the burglary conviction.
- The trial court and appellate court reviewed the statute’s plain meaning and interpretive rules, including the definition of 'dwelling' in RCW 9A.04.110(7).
- The court affirmed Neal’s conviction, concluded the building was used for lodging, and addressed jury instruction concerns about the definition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does a tool room in a residential building qualify as a dwelling? | Neal (State) argued the entire apartment building was a dwelling. | Neal contends there was no lodging in the tool room itself. | Yes; the building is used for lodging, satisfying dwelling. |
| Interpretation of 'dwelling'—portion thereof vs entire building. | State asserts the entire building can be a dwelling. | Neal relies on 'portion thereof' to limit dwelling to lodging portions. | The court affirmed the broader interpretation that the building or portion used for lodging can be a dwelling. |
| Application of the last antecedent rule to the statute. | State interprets the qualifier to apply to all antecedents. | Neal argues the qualifier attaches only to the last antecedent (portion). | Corollary rule supports applying to all antecedents; dwelling can be any lodging-used portion. |
| Effect of removing 'or portion thereof' from jury instruction. | State theory did not rely on 'portion thereof'. | Removal could misstate dwelling; harms defense. | Instruction defined dwelling accurately; omission did not misstate the element. |
| Was the instruction a comment on the evidence or a proper statement of law? | Becker-like concerns would require caution against legalizing factual issues. | Instruction did not define a fact as law; it clarified statutory term. | Instruction not a comment on the evidence; properly framed. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Bunker, 169 Wn.2d 571 (2010) (statutory plain meaning and interpretive standards)
- State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444 (2003) (plain meaning governs when language is unambiguous)
- State v. Murbach, 68 Wn. App. 509 (1993) (garage attached to home as dwelling, when used for lodging)
- State v. Walker, 136 Wn.2d 767 (1998) (de novo review of statutory interpretation)
- State v. Becker, 132 Wn.2d 54 (1997) (technical terms rule and courtroom labeling)
- State v. Redmond, 150 Wn.2d 489 (2003) (jury instruction standard—not misleading when viewed as a whole)