State v. Nathan Wade Herren, 339 P.3d 1126

Background

In 2008 Herren pleaded guilty to misdemeanor malicious injury to property; the magistrate court entered a withheld judgment and a no-contact order prohibiting contact and "knowingly remain[ing] within 100 feet" of Kip McDermott.
In January 2009 Herren attended a homeowners association meeting where McDermott was present; he moved to the back but did not leave and was arrested for violating the no-contact order. The parties disputed whether Herren made eye contact with McDermott.
At trial the magistrate found the library was less than 100 feet (based on Herren later measuring) and convicted Herren of violating the no-contact order for knowingly remaining within 100 feet.
The State moved to revoke Herren’s withheld judgment in the prior malicious-injury case, alleging the no-contact conviction was a new crime violating probation terms; Herren admitted the probation violation and the magistrate revoked the withheld judgment.
The district court affirmed both the no-contact conviction and the probation revocation; the Court of Appeals reversed the no-contact conviction; the Idaho Supreme Court granted review.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Idaho Code § 18-920(2) criminalizes violations of the terms of a no-contact order (including distance restrictions)	§ 18-920 and I.C.R. 46.2 show "contact" is defined by the order, so any prohibited conduct (e.g., remaining within 100 ft) can be a § 18-920 violation	"Contact" must retain its ordinary meaning (physical/communicative contact); not every breach of an order creates a separate crime	Court did not decide the broad statutory question but held the specific conviction lacked evidence because "remaining within 100 feet" is distinct from "contact" as used in the order; reversed conviction
Whether substantial evidence supported the magistrate’s finding that Herren "contacted" McDermott in violation of § 18-920(2)	The State: Herren knowingly remained within the proscribed distance, satisfying the statute (as the order defines prohibited contact)	Herren: No evidence of actual contact; remaining within distance without contact is not "contact" under § 18-920(2)	No substantial competent evidence that Herren "contacted" McDermott; conviction reversed
Whether Herren’s admission supported revocation of the earlier withheld judgment (probation violation)	The State: Herren’s admission to violating probation by committing the new crime suffices to revoke probation	Herren: Contends probation violation depended solely on invalid no-contact conviction	Admission is a judicial admission and constitutes substantial evidence; revocation affirmed
Whether courts may treat a judge’s individualized no-contact restrictions as creating crimes	State urged deference to order language; legislative role unstated	Herren argued legislative primacy in defining crimes	Court declined to adopt State’s interpretation and noted separation-of-powers concerns; invited Legislature to clarify statute

Key Cases Cited

State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 170 P.3d 387 (discussing review of Court of Appeals decisions)
In re Doe, 147 Idaho 243, 207 P.3d 974 (direct review of district court acting in appellate capacity)
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (affirmance where magistrate findings have substantial evidence)
Hausladen v. Knoche, 149 Idaho 449, 235 P.3d 399 (standards for appellate review)
State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 175 P.3d 788 (statutory interpretation is question of law)
In re Snook, 94 Idaho 904, 499 P.2d 1260 (interpretation of disjunctive phrasing in orders)
Filer Mut. Tel. Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 76 Idaho 256, 281 P.2d 478 (interpretation of statutory language)
Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660, 791 P.2d 410 (legislature has lawmaking power)
Malloroy v. State, 91 Idaho 914, 435 P.2d 254 (only legislature may define crimes)
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 233 P.3d 33 (probation-violation standard: substantial evidence)
Consol. AG of Curry, Inc. v. Rangen, Inc., 128 Idaho 228, 912 P.2d 115 (rulings may be upheld on any theory)
State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 272 P.3d 382 (effect of voluntary guilty plea)
State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 11 P.3d 1101 (guilty plea waives nonjurisdictional defects)
State v. Tipton, 99 Idaho 670, 587 P.2d 305 (guilty plea as judicial admission)
State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 1 P.3d 809 (admission supports probation-violation finding)