State v. Nash, 2011 Mo. LEXIS 122

Judy Spencer was murdered on March 11, 1982; Nash, her boyfriend, lived with her.
DNA testing in 2007 found Nash's DNA under Judy's left-hand fingernails, with only Nash and Judy's DNA detected.
Nash was tried and convicted of capital murder under §565.001, RSMo 1978, and sentenced to life imprisonment without probation or parole for 50 years.
§565.001 was repealed in 1983 and replaced by new Chapter 565; 1.160 saving statute addresses pre-repeal offenses, and Nash argues the repeal invalidates his charge.
The Supreme Court of Missouri, exercising discretion under Art. V, §10, initially considered jurisdictional issues but proceeded to address Nash’s asserted errors, including the direct connection rule for third-party guilt evidence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 1978 §565.001 applies despite 1983 repeal	Nash (State) argues §565.001 is superseded and cannot punish pre-1984 murders	Nash argues saving statute §1.160 and Article III, §28 render the conviction invalid	Conviction proper; §565.001 may govern pre-1984 murders despite repeal
Sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction	State contends DNA plus corroborating evidence proves guilt beyond reasonable doubt	Nash contends DNA evidence is insufficient and could reflect casual contact	Sufficient evidence, including DNA under fingernails and corroborating conduct, supported guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
Whether a circumstantial-evidence instruction was required	Nash contends 1982 circumstantial instruction should have been given	Court should not reintroduce Grim-era instruction as it is redundant with reasonable-doubt standard	Instruction not required; refusal not reversible error; Grim rejected circumstantial rule as redundant
admissibility of third-person guilt evidence under the direct connection rule	State concedes exclusion of Feldman evidence; argues rule constitutional under Holmes	Nash asserts direct connection rule violates due process and right to present defense	Direct connection rule constitutional; Feldman evidence excluded appropriately; rule aligns with Holmes jurisprudence

Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (U.S. 2006) (recognizes constitutional right to present complete defense; government may exclude defense evidence if its probative value is outweighed by concerns like prejudice)
Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. banc 1993) (rejected the circumstantial-evidence instruction as unnecessary with a proper reasonable-doubt standard)
State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. banc 1998) (sets the direct connection rule for admissibility of third-party guilt evidence)
Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (U.S. 2000) (ex post facto concerns when changing rules of evidence to affect guilt)
State v. Hampton, 959 S.W.2d 444 (Mo. banc 1997) (post-Grim standard for sufficiency review and credibility of expert testimony)
Drury v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 905 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. App. 1995) (primary goal of jury instructions is clarity and accurate burden of proof)
Holmes v. United States (cited via Holmes v. South Carolina), 547 U.S. 319 (U.S. 2006) (discusses limits on defense-evidence exclusion and the balancing test for probative value)
Brizendine v. Conrad, 71 S.W.3d 587 (Mo. banc 2002) (abrogates waiver-based arguments in Rule 84.04(d) contexts)