State v. Naquan O'neil (072072), 219 N.J. 598

Defendant Naquan O’Neil fatally shot Hassan Hardy after prior violent encounters and claimed self-defense.
Trial court told the jury self-defense applied to murder but not to aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter, which are based on recklessness.
Jury acquitted of murder but convicted aggravated manslaughter, unlawful possession of a handgun, and guns-forbidden-use charge.
Appellate counsel did not challenge the self-defense instruction on direct appeal, relying on Moore’s language.
Rodriguez (2007) held self-defense can be a defense to manslaughter, affecting similar cases, and Rodriguez was decided after this case’s appeal was submitted.
PCR petition claimed ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the Rodriguez issue; the trial court and Appellate Division denied relief.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was appellate counsel ineffective for not raising Rodriguez on direct appeal?	O’Neil argues Rodriguez controlled; failure breached Strickland.	State argues Rodriguez not retroactive and counsel acted reasonably.	Counsel’s performance deficient; remand for new trial.
Should Rodriguez’s rule apply retroactively in this PCR context?	Rodriguez announced a longstanding, controlling rule affecting manslaughter defenses.	Rodriguez is a new rule; retroactivity limited by finality concerns.	Retroactivity not dispositive; focus on deficient representation and prejudice.
Did the erroneous jury instruction undermine confidence in the verdict, warranting relief?	If self-defense could apply to lesser offenses, conviction may be reversed with new trial.	Unclear impact on the outcome; jury acquitted murder.	Yes; erroneous instruction undermines confidence; remand for a new trial.

State v. Rodriguez, 195 N.J. 165 (N.J. 2008) (self-defense can be a defense to manslaughter)
State v. Moore, 158 N.J. 292 (N.J. 1999) (dicta that justification defenses unavailable where recklessness suffices)
State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178 (N.J. 1984) (self-defense may negate recklessness in manslaughter context)
State v. Ciuffreda, 127 N.J. 73 (N.J. 1992) (self-defense could apply to aggravated and reckless manslaughter)
State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458 (N.J. 2005) (sentencing/remand framework for certain convictions)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Fritz v. vent, 105 N.J. 42 (N.J. 1987) (state-level application of Strickland standard)
Hogan, 336 N.J. Super. 319 (N.J. App. Div. 2001) (early application of self-defense in related context)
Ballard v. United States, 400 F.3d 404 (6th Cir. 2005) (constitutional ineffective assistance analysis)
Stallings v. United States, 536 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2008) (post-conviction performance scrutiny for appellate counsel)
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (U.S. 1986) (framework for collateral attack on trial counsel)