State v. N. R. L.
311 P.3d 510
Or.2013Background
- Youth (juvenile) admitted to acts that would be second-degree burglary and first-degree criminal mischief if committed by an adult; juvenile court adjudicated him delinquent and ordered $114,071.13 in restitution.
- Youth moved for a jury trial on the amount of restitution under Article I, §17 (right to jury in "all civil cases"); juvenile court denied the motion.
- Court of Appeals rejected youth’s claim, holding juvenile restitution is penal not civil and affirmed the restitution order.
- Youth argued that post-2003 constitutional and statutory changes (Article I, §42 and amendments to ORS 419C.450) converted juvenile restitution into a civil, victim-compensatory remedy requiring a jury trial.
- State argued restitution under ORS 419C.450 remains an aspect of juvenile sanctions (penal in nature), enforced by the state and not a private civil action by the victim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Article I, §17 (trial by jury in all civil cases) requires a jury for restitution determinations under ORS 419C.450 | Youth: statutory amendments and Article I, §42 made juvenile restitution a civil damages-like remedy entitling youth to a jury | State: juvenile restitution is a penal sanction imposed by the court as part of disposition and remains noncivil; victims are not private parties enforcing a civil claim | Held: Restitution under ORS 419C.450 is not civil in nature; no jury right under Art I, §17 |
| Whether mandatory restitution (post-2003) changed restitution’s primary purpose from penal to compensatory | Youth: mandatory restitution shows shift to compensatory, civil purpose | State: mandatory imposition underscores penal character; restitution still serves rehabilitative/deterrent aims and is enforced by the state | Held: Mandatory status does not convert restitution into a civil remedy; penal characteristics persist |
| Whether victims acquire a private civil right to enforce restitution under ORS 147.500–147.550 and thus trigger jury protections | Youth: victims’ rights provisions give victims an enforceable right analogous to civil damages | State: victims’ procedures enforce a constitutional right to prompt restitution vis-à-vis the state, not a private damage action against the juvenile | Held: Victim remedies under those statutes/Art I, §42 are not private civil damage actions and do not make restitution civil |
| Whether precedents construing adult restitution (Hart) or juvenile procedural distinctions control | Youth: distinctions between juvenile and adult systems plus statutory change mean Hart is distinguishable | State: Hart and other precedents show restitution’s hybrid but primarily penal character; juvenile proceedings may differ but restitution remains punitive | Held: Hart and related authorities control the analysis; restitution is an aspect of criminal/penal law, not civil |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Hart, 299 Or 128 (restitution is an aspect of criminal law; no jury right for restitution)
- State v. Rangel, 328 Or 294 (standard of review for denial of jury motion)
- M.K.F. v. Miramontes, 352 Or 401 (Article I, §17 applies based on nature of claim)
- State v. Reynolds, 317 Or 560 (juvenile jurisdiction is not a "criminal prosecution" under Art I, §11)
- State v. Dillon, 292 Or 172 (restitution understood as penal)
- State v. McCullough, 347 Or 350 (juvenile conduct can constitute crime even if juvenile treatment differs)
- State v. N. R. L., 249 Or App 321 (Ct. App. decision rejecting jury right for juvenile restitution)
- 1920 Studebaker Touring Car et al., 120 Or 254 (Article I, §17 construed broadly to apply to later-created claims)