State v. Myers, 343 Conn. 447

Background

In 2007, Kevin Myers (age 15) committed sexual assaults in two separate incidents; he was later convicted in two separate Superior Court dockets.
July 2009 sentence (first docket): total effective 18 years imprisonment followed by 22 years special parole. December 2011 (second docket, Alford plea): 14 years imprisonment + 6 years special parole, ordered concurrent with the 18‑year sentence.
After P.A. 15‑84 and Supreme Court juvenile decisions (Miller, Montgomery), Myers filed motions to correct illegal sentence in both dockets claiming the sentencing courts failed to consider youth (Miller and §54‑91g) and that the Board of Pardons and Paroles’ parole‑eligibility calculation (apparently based on the 14‑year term) denied him a meaningful opportunity for parole under §54‑125a(f)(1), violated his plea understanding, due process, and equal protection.
The trial court dismissed several claims and denied others; Myers appealed. Key legal question: whether motions to correct are a proper vehicle to attack the board’s parole‑eligibility calculation and whether Miller/§54‑91g required resentencing.
Connecticut Supreme Court held the trial court had jurisdiction to consider Miller/§54‑91g claims (so dismissal was improper), but Miller did not apply on the merits (Myers was not serving life or functional equivalent and parole was available) and §54‑91g is not retroactive; parole‑calculation claims were jurisdictionally defective because the board (not the sentencing court) determines parole eligibility and the proper forum is habeas after administrative exhaustion.
Court remanded to correct the form of judgment (deny Miller/§54‑91g claims; dismiss plea‑agreement due process claim) and affirmed in other respects.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Myers)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
1. Is a motion to correct an illegal sentence a proper vehicle to challenge the Board’s parole‑eligibility calculation?	Motion to correct is proper because board’s calculation affects practical parole opportunity and thus sentence legality.	No; the board, not the sentencing court, calculates parole dates—such challenges attack an administrative act and belong in habeas after exhaustion.	Held: Jurisdictional defect for parole‑calculation claims; trial court lacked subject‑matter jurisdiction—proper forum is habeas.
2. Did sentencing courts fail to consider youth under Miller and §54‑91g, requiring resentencing?	Myers: courts did not consider hallmark features of adolescence; resentencing required.	State: Miller applies only to life or its functional equivalent; §54‑91g is not retroactive.	Held: Court had jurisdiction to hear these claims (should have denied, not dismissed). On merits: Miller inapplicable (not life/functional equivalent and parole available); §54‑91g does not apply retroactively.
3. Did the Board misapply §54‑125a(f)(1) by using the 14‑year term rather than the 18‑year or total effective sentence, denying meaningful parole opportunity?	Myers: Board should use the longest or total effective sentence to compute eligibility, which would yield an earlier date.	State: Board’s statutory interpretation and calculation are administrative actions; not challenged via motion to correct.	Held: Claim challenges board interpretation/application; trial court lacked jurisdiction; proper remedy is habeas after administrative remedies exhausted.
4. Did the parole calculation violate the plea understanding, due process, or equal protection?	Myers: Concurrent sentencing reflected intent that earlier (18‑year) sentence govern parole; current calculation breached plea terms and treats him differently than similarly situated juveniles.	State: No plea promise about parole; sentencing court statement and timing explain concurrent order; calculation was board action.	Held: Trial court should have dismissed (not denied) the plea/due‑process claim; equal protection and related claims target board action and are jurisdictionally defective.

Key Cases Cited

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (U.S. 2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment; courts must consider youth‑related factors)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (U.S. 2016) (Miller held retroactive; states may remedy Miller violations by parole procedures)
State v. Riley, 315 Conn. 637 (Conn. 2015) (court must consider Miller factors before imposing a sentence that is the functional equivalent of life without parole)
State v. Delgado, 323 Conn. 801 (Conn. 2016) (legislature did not intend §54‑91g to apply retroactively)
State v. Coltherst, 341 Conn. 97 (Conn. 2021) (when concurrent/ consecutive multi‑docket sentences would render parole meaningless, sentencing legality may be implicated in a motion to correct)
State v. Evans, 329 Conn. 770 (Conn. 2018) (distinguishes jurisdictional inquiry from merits; a colorable challenge to sentence is required for motion to correct jurisdiction)
State v. McCleese, 333 Conn. 378 (Conn. 2019) (Practice Book §43‑22 preserves limited jurisdiction to correct illegal sentences; court must identify colorable claim)