State v. Myers
919 N.W.2d 893
Neb.2018Background
- In 1995 James E. Myers was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and related weapon offenses for the killing of Lynette Mainelli; convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.
- In 2016 Myers (pro se) moved under Nebraska’s DNA Testing Act for DNA testing of 26 items (bedding, casings, clothing, cigarette butts, a sexual-assault kit, hair samples, etc.) to attempt to exclude him as a DNA donor.
- Myers alleged modern testing could identify biological material not previously testable, would be noncumulative and exculpatory, and would contradict witness statements that implicated him; he also sought appointment of counsel.
- The State’s inventory showed the requested items remained in its possession; a lab report indicated a sexual-assault kit contained "very few spermatozoa." Myers submitted an affidavit but presented no other evidence at the hearing.
- The district court denied testing and counsel, reasoning that even exclusion of Myers’ DNA would not exonerate him given trial evidence (e.g., witnesses who said he wore gloves and inculpatory statements), and the court quoted post-testing relief standards in its analysis.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding the district court applied the wrong (post-testing relief) standard when deciding whether to order testing and directing reconsideration under § 29-4120(5); it also remanded the counsel question for reconsideration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court must order DNA testing under § 29-4120(5) | Myers: items meet statutory criteria and testing may produce noncumulative, exculpatory evidence | State: cumulative to existing evidence; testing would not exonerate given trial testimony | Remanded — district court applied wrong standard; must decide under § 29-4120(5) whether testing may produce noncumulative, exculpatory evidence |
| Whether district court improperly applied post-testing relief standards when denying testing | Myers: court should evaluate only threshold for ordering tests, not whether results would vacate judgment | State: emphasized totality of evidence showing culpability | Held for Myers on procedural grounds — district court mixed standards and must re-evaluate under the correct, lower threshold for ordering testing |
| Whether Myers was entitled to appointment of counsel under the DNA Testing Act | Myers: counsel needed because DNA testing may be relevant to wrongful conviction claim | State: appointment unnecessary absent showing testing relevance | Remanded — appointment of counsel must be reconsidered after proper § 29-4120(5) analysis |
| Whether alleged suppression/non-disclosure of biological evidence is reviewable via DNA Testing Act motion | Myers: police withheld existence of sexual-assault kit and vaginal sample, violating due process | State: such constitutional challenge is outside the Act’s DNA-testing remedial framework | Denied as part of DNA motion — court need not consider suppression claim on remand; constitutional suppression claim not resolved via the Act |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Buckman, 267 Neb. 505, 675 N.W.2d 372 (2004) (explains threshold for ordering DNA testing and higher standards for post-testing relief)
- State v. Bronson, 267 Neb. 103, 672 N.W.2d 244 (2003) (discusses standards for vacating convictions based on DNA results)
- State v. Betancourt-Garcia, 299 Neb. 775, 910 N.W.2d 164 (2018) (confirms standards of review and application of Nebraska’s DNA Testing Act)