State v. Murrin, 435 P.3d 1126

Background

On Aug. 18, 2014, Brian Murrin, visibly intoxicated, returned to his mother‑in‑law Grace True’s property after being told to leave; Officer Scott Galindo warned him he would be arrested if he returned.
Murrin returned, was seen on the porch, fled when Galindo announced “police, stop,” was later located, placed under arrest, and resisted while officers took him into custody.
Officers found marijuana and paraphernalia on Murrin; he admitted heavy drinking and drug use that night and testified to impaired, hazy recollection. Wife Alea corroborated his intoxication; True described apparent heavy intoxication.
Murrin was convicted of criminal trespass, interference with law enforcement, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia; he requested a voluntary‑intoxication instruction for the drug counts only, which the court gave.
On appeal Murrin argued the court should also have instructed on voluntary intoxication for criminal trespass and interference with law enforcement; the Court of Appeals affirmed and the Kansas Supreme Court granted review only on the voluntary‑intoxication instruction issue.
The Supreme Court held voluntary intoxication is available when a statute requires a stand‑alone mental element apart from the actus reus; it applied that test to find trespass qualifies but interference with law enforcement does not — except the trial judge’s instruction had added a knowledge element to the interference charge, which would make the defense applicable as given. Nonetheless the failure to give the additional instructions was not clearly erroneous.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether voluntary intoxication instruction was required for criminal trespass	State: not appropriate because crimes are general intent based on "knows/knowingly" language	Murrin: statute’s "knows" element is a separate, stand‑alone state of mind so intoxication can negate it	Court: Trespass requires a stand‑alone mental element (knows not authorized); voluntary intoxication instruction would have been legally appropriate but failure to give it was not clearly erroneous
Whether voluntary intoxication instruction was required for interference with law enforcement	State: statute’s "knowingly" modifies actus reus; no separate mental element, so intoxication defense not available	Murrin: "knowingly" still allows intoxication to negate mental state	Court: On statute alone, "knowingly" only modifies actus reus so intoxication not available; but judge’s instruction added a "knew or should have known officer status" element making intoxication applicable as charged; error in failing to instruct, but not clearly erroneous

Key Cases Cited

State v. Hobbs, 301 Kan. 203 (2015) (interpreting effect of culpable‑mental‑state recodification on aggravated battery and general vs. specific intent)
State v. McClelland, 301 Kan. 815 (2013) (standard for reversal when an unpreserved jury‑instruction error is claimed as clear error)
State v. Mountjoy, 257 Kan. 163 (1995) (discussion of historical usage of "intentional" and related terms in Kansas criminal code)
State v. Brown, 305 Kan. 674 (2017) (elements of obstruction/interference and inclusion of knowledge that the person opposed is an officer)
State v. Sterling, 235 Kan. 526 (1984) (distinguishing general vs. specific intent crimes for voluntary intoxication defense)