State v. Murray, 416 P.3d 1225

Murray was released from jail and 16 days later committed three indecent exposures involving four women; two incidents included masturbation.
Because of a prior indecent liberties conviction, the three indecent exposure counts were felonies; prosecution alleged two aggravators: sexual motivation and rapid recidivism.
A jury convicted Murray on all counts and found both aggravators proven; the trial court imposed an exceptional 36‑month sentence.
Murray appealed, arguing the sexual‑motivation aggravator cannot apply to indecent exposure and that the rapid recidivism aggravator is void for vagueness as applied; the Court of Appeals affirmed and the State Supreme Court granted review on those two issues.
The Supreme Court reviewed statutory interpretation and constitutional vagueness de novo and affirmed: (1) sexual‑motivation may apply to indecent exposure because the crime does not inherently require sexual motive, and (2) the rapid recidivism aggravator was not vague as applied to reoffending 16 days after release.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Murray)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether the sexual‑motivation aggravator (RCW 9.94A.535(3)(f)) can apply to indecent exposure	Indecent exposure is inherently sexual (lascivious/obscene), so sexual motivation is an element and cannot be used as an aggravator	Indecent exposure can be committed for nonsexual motives; sexual motivation is not inherent, so the aggravator may apply when proven	The aggravator may apply; indecent exposure does not inherently require sexual motive, so sexual motivation can be an aggravator
Whether the rapid recidivism aggravator (RCW 9.94A.535(3)(t)) is void for vagueness as applied	The term “shortly after” is undefined and leaves jurors to guess; vague as applied to Murray	A person of reasonable understanding would view reoffending 16 days after release as „shortly after;‟ prior case law supports short periods (hours to a month) qualifying	Not void as applied: reoffending 16 days after release is sufficiently definite to satisfy due process

State v. Thomas, 138 Wash.2d 630 (1999) (cannot base an exceptional sentence on factors inherent to the offense)
State v. Armendariz, 160 Wash.2d 106 (2007) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
State v. Rice, 174 Wash.2d 884 (2012) (constitutional questions reviewed de novo)
State v. Stubbs, 170 Wash.2d 117 (2010) (aggravator that encompasses an element of the offense cannot be used to enhance sentence)
City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d 171 (1990) (vagueness doctrine; statutes must give fair warning and prevent arbitrary enforcement)
State v. Duncalf, 177 Wash.2d 289 (2013) (vagueness standards and application to non‑First Amendment challenges)
State v. Halstien, 122 Wash.2d 109 (1993) (precision not required to the point of complete certainty; reasonable understanding suffices)
State v. Bahl, 164 Wash.2d 739 (2008) (use of dictionary definitions when terms are undefined)
State v. Cham, 165 Wash. App. 438 (2011) (crime within one hour of release satisfied "shortly after")
State v. Butler, 75 Wash. App. 47 (1994) (crimes within hours of release qualify as "shortly after")
State v. Saltz, 137 Wash. App. 576 (2007) (one month after release can qualify as "shortly after")
State v. Combs, 156 Wash. App. 502 (2010) (six months after release did not qualify for an impulse crime)
State v. Galbreath, 69 Wash.2d 664 (1966) (definition of "obscene" as lascivious exhibition)