State v. Munoz, 309 Neb. 285

Background

Munoz was convicted by jury of first-degree murder and use of a deadly weapon; sentenced to life plus a consecutive 20–40 years. Direct appeal (with different counsel) affirmed.
Victim suffered 37 stab wounds; no forensic evidence positively linked Munoz; blood-spatter testimony suggested someone washed blood off; sexual-assault kit yielded only victim DNA.
Timeline: neighbor reported concern Dec. 30; officers visited Dec. 31 but did not search beyond a bedroom door; victim discovered Jan. 3 after manager used a master key; Munoz left for Illinois shortly after being released from hospital and made incriminating statements to others and transporting officers.
Munoz filed a pro se postconviction motion alleging layered ineffective-assistance claims: failure to investigate/depose witnesses (Manuel Trevino, Jolene Condon) and present an alibi; failure to suppress or exclude statements; failure to call experts (blood-spatter/mental-stability); and failure to file/preserve a motion in limine.
The district court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, finding allegations largely conclusory or procedurally barred because trial counsel differed from direct-appeal counsel and alleged defects were apparent from the record.
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed: claims lacked the required specificity (what each witness or expert would have testified) and some claims relied on inadmissible hearsay or were not raised below.

Issues

Issue	Munoz's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether claims against trial counsel are procedurally barred because different counsel represented Munoz on direct appeal	Munoz argued trial counsel was ineffective (e.g., juror challenges, jury instructions, failure to object) and these claims justify postconviction relief	State argued such claims were known or apparent on the record and should have been raised on direct appeal, so they are procedurally barred	Held: Claims against trial counsel that were known or apparent from the record are procedurally barred because Munoz had different counsel on direct appeal
Whether allegations about alibi and flight witnesses (Trevino, Condon) were sufficiently specific to require an evidentiary hearing	Munoz claimed these witnesses would have established his whereabouts/alibi and undermined the State’s theory	State argued the motion failed to state what each witness would have testified, so it was conclusory and amounted to discovery	Held: Denied—allegations were conclusory; defendant must plead specific expected testimony to trigger an evidentiary hearing
Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to call expert witnesses (blood-spatter; mental stability)	Munoz claimed experts would have refuted State’s blood-spatter theory and established timing/mental state	State argued allegations lacked specifics about expected expert opinions and were not shown to be material or likely to change the verdict	Held: Denied—claims were speculative/conclusory and did not identify the substance of expected expert testimony
Whether failure to move in limine or to preserve its denial on appeal constituted ineffective assistance	Munoz argued appellate counsel failed to preserve or raise a motion-in-limine-related error, prejudicing him	State argued the motion lacked any description of what evidence should have been excluded, why it was inadmissible, or how prejudice resulted; some variants were not raised in the verified motion	Held: Denied—allegations did not specify the evidence, grounds for exclusion, or resulting prejudice; some claims were not raised below and thus not considered

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective-assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
State v. Foster, 300 Neb. 883, 916 N.W.2d 562 (2018) (postconviction motions must specifically allege expected witness testimony)
State v. Marshall, 269 Neb. 56, 690 N.W.2d 593 (procedural bar when trial counsel differs from direct-appeal counsel and defects were apparent from the record)
State v. Stelly, 308 Neb. 636, 955 N.W.2d 729 (discussion of Strickland framework in Nebraska postconviction context)
State v. Poe, 292 Neb. 60, 870 N.W.2d 779 (hearsay definition and admissibility principles)
State v. Parnell, 305 Neb. 932, 943 N.W.2d 678 (procedural-bar principles for postconviction claims)