State v. Munoz, 309 Neb. 285

Background

Munoz was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and use of a deadly weapon; sentenced to life plus 20–40 years. No forensic evidence directly linked him to the crime scene; victim suffered 37 stab wounds and was discovered days later in Munoz’s apartment. Munoz left the state soon after and made incriminating statements to others and law enforcement.
Munoz was represented by different counsel on direct appeal; his convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal.
Munoz filed a pro se postconviction motion alleging layered ineffective-assistance claims: failure to investigate/depose witnesses (Manuel Trevino and Jolene Condon), failure to present an alibi, failure to call expert(s) to rebut blood-spatter evidence or assess mental stability, failure to suppress unspecified statements, and failure to file/preserve a motion in limine.
The district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, concluding the motion contained only conclusory allegations, failed to specify the expected testimony or evidence, and some claims were procedurally barred because trial counsel differed from appellate counsel.
On appeal Munoz argued the district court erred in refusing an evidentiary hearing and that both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in various respects.
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, holding Munoz’s postconviction claims were either procedurally barred, conclusory, lacked the required specificity about proposed testimony/evidence, or relied on inadmissible hearsay.

Issues

Issue	Munoz (plaintiff)	State (defendant)	Held
Whether postconviction motion alleged facts requiring an evidentiary hearing on counsel’s failure to investigate/depose alibi/flight witnesses	Trial counsel failed to interview/depose Trevino and Condon whose testimony would have established an alibi or rebut the State’s theory	Allegations were conclusory, lacked specific proffer of witness testimony, and thus did not warrant a hearing	Denied — claims were conclusory or insufficiently specific; no hearing required
Whether claims against trial counsel are procedurally barred because appellate counsel differed	Munoz argued trial-counsel errors preserved via postconviction motion	State: errors known/apparent on record and must have been raised on direct appeal when counsel differs	Held procedurally barred to the extent claims were asserted only against trial counsel and were apparent from the record
Whether failure to call expert on blood-spatter (or mental-state expert) warranted relief	An expert would have refuted State’s blood-spatter timing/culpability and/or established Munoz’s mental instability	Allegations failed to identify the expert’s expected testimony, what evidence would have shown, or how the outcome would change	Denied — pleaded only conclusions without specifics; no hearing granted
Whether failure to move in limine / preserve motion in limine warranted relief	Trial/appellate counsel failed to exclude or preserve exclusion of prejudicial evidence	Motion lacked any description of the evidence to be excluded, basis for exclusion, or prejudice	Denied — insufficient specificity; claim did not warrant evidentiary hearing

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel: deficient performance and prejudice)
State v. Stelly, 308 Neb. 636, 955 N.W.2d 729 (2021) (standards for pleading and reviewing postconviction ineffective-assistance claims)
State v. Foster, 300 Neb. 883, 916 N.W.2d 562 (requirement that postconviction motions specifically allege the substance of proposed witness testimony)
State v. Marshall, 269 Neb. 56, 690 N.W.2d 593 (ineffective-assistance claims procedurally barred when trial counsel differs from direct-appeal counsel and defects are apparent in the record)
State v. Poe, 292 Neb. 60, 870 N.W.2d 779 (definition and exclusion of hearsay evidence)
State v. Parnell, 305 Neb. 932, 943 N.W.2d 678 (procedural-bar principles in postconviction context)