State v. Mucia, 292 Neb. 1

Background

In 2011, police executed a warrant at Gregory M. Mucia’s apartment after software linked an IP address there to files suspected of child pornography; two laptops were seized and forensically examined.
Forensics recovered four child‑pornography videos in a file‑sharing folder, 14 recoverable files in the recycle bin, browser cache remnants, link files, and incomplete files; Mucia admitted to batch‑downloading porn via file‑sharing programs.
Mucia testified he intended to download adult pornography, would delete files he suspected depicted children, and claimed he was unaware of the four videos found by police.
The trial court convicted Mucia of knowingly possessing child pornography (Class IIA felony) and sentenced him to probation and sex offender registration; he appealed asserting insufficiency of proof of knowing possession.
The Nebraska Court of Appeals held the statute requires proof that the defendant had the specific intent to possess child pornography but found sufficient circumstantial evidence of knowing possession and affirmed; the State sought further review.
The Nebraska Supreme Court framed the question as the meaning of “knowingly possess” in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28‑813.01 and held that knowledge requires awareness of the nature/character of the material, its presence, and dominion or control over it.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
What does “knowingly possess” in § 28‑813.01 require?	State: statute is a general‑intent crime; no requirement that defendant sought child pornography	Mucia: conviction requires proof he intentionally sought or purposefully possessed child pornography; mere inadvertent receipt/deleted files insufficient	Court: knowing possession requires knowledge of nature/character of material, knowledge of its presence, and dominion or control; no separate requirement that defendant intentionally sought child pornography
Does the statute demand proof of purpose to possess (specific intent) vs. mere knowledge?	State: no specific intent to possess required; proof of knowing possession suffices	Mucia/Ct. of Appeals: interpreted as requiring specific intent to possess child pornography	Court: rejects labeling dispute as decisive; holds statute requires knowledge (applies to each element) not a heightened purpose requirement
Are downloads/cache remnants sufficient to show knowing possession?	State: circumstantial evidence (download patterns, folders, recoverable files) can prove knowing possession	Defendant: temporary/cache files or accidental downloads do not prove knowing possession	Court: accidental cache downloads may not show knowing possession; dominion/control plus knowledge of nature/presence is required; circumstantial evidence here was sufficient (not challenged)
Does the general/specific intent distinction control analysis?	State: favors treating as general intent (only knowledge required)	Concurring view: distinction remains useful; statute is general intent so purpose not needed	Court: avoids overreliance on those labels; focuses on whether mental state (knowledge) applies to material elements and adopts the knowledge standard described above

Key Cases Cited

State v. Schuller, 287 Neb. 500 (Neb. 2014) (applied constructive possession; downloading, viewing, and deleting showed knowing possession)
State v. Thurman, 273 Neb. 518 (Neb. 2007) (discussed general vs. specific intent and application of knowledge mens rea)
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (U.S. 1980) (explained limited distinction between knowledge and purpose in mens rea analysis)
State v. Mills, 199 Neb. 295 (Neb. 1977) (use of common‑law principles to define knowing possession)
State v. Howard, 282 Neb. 352 (Neb. 2011) (defining knowledge for possession of contraband)
State v. Ramsay, 257 Neb. 430 (Neb. 1997) (illustrates specific intent requirement for certain offenses and aider/abettor proof)