State v. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 914

In 2014 Krista Muccio (41) sent sexually explicit images and messages to someone she believed was a 15‑year‑old; the teen returned explicit images and messages. Muccio was charged under Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(2) (communication with a child describing sexual conduct) and with possession of child pornography.
The district court dismissed the § 609.352(2a)(2) count as facially overbroad under the First Amendment; the court of appeals affirmed. The State appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
Section 609.352, subd. 2a(2) forbids an adult from using electronic means to "engage in communication with a child" "relating to or describing sexual conduct" when the adult acts "with the intent to arouse the sexual desire of any person." A "child" is 15 or younger.
The parties disputed three interpretive points: (1) whether communications must be directed at a specific child; (2) whether the intent-to-arouse element could target any person (not just those involved); and (3) whether "sexual conduct" references only acts involving the communicants.
The court held the statute requires targeted communications (directed at a child), that "any person" in the intent clause is broad (not limited to communicants), and that "sexual conduct" may describe conduct of any person (not limited to the parties).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 609.352, subd. 2a(2) is facially overbroad under the First Amendment	Muccio: statute proscribes a substantial amount of protected speech (e.g., literary or artistic works, non‑targeted content) and is therefore facially unconstitutional	State: statute targets unprotected categories (grooming, solicitation, obscenity, child pornography); any overbreadth is insubstantial; limiting constructions available	The statute is not substantially overbroad; reversed court of appeals and upheld statute facially against overbreadth challenge
Whether "engaging in communication with a child" reaches non‑targeted mass postings	Muccio: covers mass/public posts seen by children	State: requires communications directed at a child	Held: requires affirmative act to direct or select a child as recipient (must be targeted)
Scope of "intent to arouse the sexual desire of any person"	Muccio: "any person" includes anyone but that broadness supports overbreadth claim	State/AG: should be limited to persons involved in the communication	Held: plain meaning is broad — "any person" can be anyone, not limited to communicants
Meaning of "relating to or describing sexual conduct" — must it involve the parties?	Muccio: covers references to sexual conduct involving anyone	State: terms like "individual" and "complainant" limit to the communicants	Held: not limited; statute can cover sexual conduct of any person (not confined to parties)

United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (statute restricting offers/requests for child pornography regulates speech integral to criminal conduct)
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (statute overbroad where causal link between speech and later abuse is contingent and indirect)
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (statute substantially overbroad in prohibiting indecent transmissions to minors)
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (overbreadth doctrine requires substantial overbreadth; facial invalidation is strong medicine)
Washington‑Davis, 881 N.W.2d 531 (Minn. 2016) (statute targeting promotion/solicitation tied to criminal conduct not facially invalid)
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (obscenity test and its prongs)
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (child pornography is unprotected speech)