State v. Moseley, 2014 NMCA 033

Deputy Terry McCoy observed Defendant driving 35 mph on Orchard Avenue in Farmington and activated radar; McCoy believed the posted limit there was 25 mph.
No speed-limit signs were posted at the location at the time of the stop; 25 mph signs were installed later.
Defendant was charged with DWI, open container, and speeding; he was convicted in magistrate court and appealed.
In the district court Defendant moved to suppress evidence from the traffic stop; the court found the area was a mixed-use zone (residential and business) and held no numerical speed limit under NMSA 1978 § 66-7-301(A)(2) applied there.
The district court concluded only the § 66-7-301(B) ‘‘control speed as may be necessary’’ standard applied, granted suppression, and the State appealed.
The court of appeals held § 66-7-301(A)(2) covers areas with businesses or residences (including mixed-use), and Deputy McCoy had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant because 35 mph violated the 30 mph statutory limit despite McCoy’s mistaken belief the limit was 25 mph.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 66-7-301(A)(2)’s 30 mph limit applies to mixed-use areas	§ 66-7-301(A)(2) applies; a 30 mph limit governs business or residence districts	Area is mixed-use so § 66-7-301(A)(2) does not apply; no numerical limit except § 66-7-301(B) reasonableness standard	§ 66-7-301(A)(2) applies to districts containing businesses or residences, including mixed-use areas (30 mph applies)
Whether officer’s mistaken belief about applicable posted municipal limit invalidates reasonable suspicion for the stop	Officer’s radar reading (35 mph) supported reasonable suspicion regardless of his belief about 25 vs 30 mph	Stop was premised on mistake of law (25 mph) and so lacked reasonable suspicion	Mistake of law does not defeat reasonable suspicion where officer’s observations show violation of another statute; here 35 mph violated the 30 mph statutory limit, so stop was reasonable

State v. Funderburg, 183 P.3d 922 (review standard for mixed question of fact and law)
State v. Ketelson, 257 P.3d 957 (standards for factual/legal review)
State v. Flores, 920 P.2d 1038 (reasonable suspicion requirement for traffic stops)
State v. Hubble, 206 P.3d 579 (objective test for reasonable suspicion; effect of officer mistake)
State v. Anaya, 176 P.3d 1163 (mistake of law does not invalidate stop if facts support suspicion under another statute)
State v. Saiz, 24 P.3d 365 (statutory construction principles)
State v. Marshall, 96 P.3d 801 (rejecting statutory constructions producing absurd results)