State v. Morgan, 361 Or. 47

Background

Morgan was charged with second-degree robbery under ORS 164.405(1)(b) on theory she committed third-degree robbery and was “aided by another person actually present” (Thornton).
Facts most favorable to the state: Thornton dropped Morgan and their child at store, returned to hold the child while Morgan tried on clothes; store security confronted Morgan after noticing missing items; Morgan resisted and jumped into Thornton’s car; Thornton started the car, drove forward striking an employee and fleeing at high speed.
At trial Morgan moved for judgment of acquittal arguing the state must prove Thornton knowingly acted as an accomplice (intent to promote or facilitate the robbery); trial court denied the motion and convicted Morgan of second-degree robbery.
On appeal Morgan argued the aider must have specific intent to promote the robbery; the Court of Appeals held ORS 164.405(1)(b) does not require the aider’s knowledge of the theft and affirmed the conviction.
Oregon Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the person who “aids” must have intent to facilitate the robbery, and to review sufficiency of evidence under the light-most-favorable-to-the-state standard.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the phrase “aided by another person actually present” requires the aider to act with intent to promote or facilitate the robbery	State: No specific mental state required for the aider; conduct that facilitates the robbery is sufficient	Morgan: Yes — aider must be an accomplice who acted with intent to promote or facilitate the robbery	Held: The aider must have acted with intent to promote or facilitate the robbery (accomplice mental state required).
Whether statutory text and context supply an aider mental-state requirement	State: Legislature used plain word “aided” without mens rea term so intent is unnecessary	Morgan: Definitions, common usage and legislative history support requiring intent to facilitate	Held: Text, common usage, context, and legislative history support requiring the aider’s intent.
Whether legislative use of ORS 161.155 (accomplice liability) forecloses an aider-intent requirement in ORS 164.405(1)(b)	State: When legislature wants intent it says so (ORS 161.155) so ORS 164.405(1)(b) needs only conduct	Morgan: Comparable statutory uses and common-law origins indicate the phrase contemplates an accomplice present with intent	Held: Comparison to related statutes and legislative history supports reading intent requirement into ORS 164.405(1)(b).
Sufficiency of evidence that Thornton acted with intent to facilitate Morgan’s robbery	State: Evidence (knowledge of security stops, Morgan’s resistance, Thornton driving off and hitting employee) supports inference of intent	Morgan: Thornton acted for self-interest (avoid discovery of drugs) and lacked knowledge of theft	Held: Viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the state, a rational trier of fact could find Thornton had requisite awareness and intent; conviction affirmed under that standard.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Morgan, 274 Or. App. 792, 364 P.3d 690 (Or. Ct. App. 2015) (Court of Appeals decision affirming conviction and construing aide requirement)
State v. Walker, 356 Or. 4, 333 P.3d 316 (2014) (use of legislative history in statutory interpretation)
State v. Pine, 336 Or. 194, 82 P.3d 130 (2003) (interpreting "aided by another person actually present" in assault statute and common-law principal theory)
State v. Phillips, 354 Or. 598, 317 P.3d 236 (2013) (further tracing common-law origins of principals and accomplices)
State v. Rose, 311 Or. 274, 810 P.2d 839 (1991) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence challenges)
State v. Gonzalez-Valenzuela, 358 Or. 451, 365 P.3d 116 (2015) (distinguishing types of trial objections and standards of review)
State v. Simonov, 358 Or. 531, 368 P.3d 11 (2016) (discussion of culpable mental states for conduct and circumstance elements)