State v. Moore, 518 S.W.3d 877

Background

On Oct. 25, 2012 an undercover officer purchased heroin from Reginald Saddler; Dwight Moore drove Saddler and parked nearby during the sale and encouraged Saddler to finish the transaction.
After the sale, unmarked and marked police vehicles followed and attempted to effectuate an arrest/stop; officers identified themselves and ordered Moore and Saddler out of the car.
Moore fled in his vehicle at high speed, struck a pedestrian, ran a stop sign, drove over spike strips, and tossed cash from the vehicle; police later matched the tossed bills to the undercover buy.
Three children (ages 2, 3, 7) were seated unrestrained in the backseat throughout the transaction, the arrest attempt, and the high‑speed flight.
A jury convicted Moore of one count of resisting a lawful stop and three counts of first‑degree child endangerment; the trial court imposed seven years for resisting and 13 years on each child‑endangerment count (two of those consecutive), for a total of 26 years. Clerical misnumbering of the counts occurred in the oral pronouncement and written judgment.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Moore's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence for resisting a lawful stop (§575.150)	Evidence showed visible lights/siren, officers announced themselves, Moore fled and tried to avoid stop — a juror could find Moore knew officers were attempting a lawful stop and fled to prevent it.	Insufficient proof Moore knew or should have known officers were attempting a lawful stop or that he fled to prevent the stop.	Affirmed: evidence sufficient for conviction.
Sufficiency of evidence for first‑degree child endangerment (§568.045) — substantial risk element	High‑speed flight, traffic violations, unrestrained children, hitting a pedestrian, and spike strips created a substantial risk to children's life/body/health.	Because children were not injured, and without proof Moore acted knowingly to create substantial risk, evidence is insufficient.	Affirmed: juror reasonably could find Moore created substantial risk.
Sufficiency for first‑degree child endangerment — knowingly mens rea	From conduct (high‑speed flight with unrestrained children, hitting a pedestrian) jurors could infer Moore was aware his conduct was practically certain to create risk.	State failed to prove Moore acted knowingly (practical certainty) rather than merely negligently.	Affirmed: evidence supports inference of knowing conduct.
Trial court’s failure to define “knowingly” and “acted with criminal negligence” after jury question (plain error)	No plain error: court properly responded neutrally; Moore invited error on criminal‑negligence definition by proffering an instruction omitting the MAI‑CR language; neither party requested the written definition of "knowingly."	Failure to define those terms confused jury and prejudiced Moore; plain error review required.	Denied: no plain error; Moore invited the criminal‑negligence omission and definitions were not required/requested; overwhelming evidence of knowing conduct.
Clerical misnumbering of counts in oral pronouncement and written judgment	Errors were clerical and did not produce manifest injustice; record shows trial court’s sentencing intent clearly — remedy is nunc pro tunc correction.	Procedural error requiring remand for resentencing.	Remanded for entry of judgment nunc pro tunc to correct numbering; convictions and sentences otherwise affirmed.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Lammers, 479 S.W.3d 624 (Mo. banc 2016) (standard for appellate sufficiency review)
State v. Hunt, 451 S.W.3d 251 (Mo. banc 2014) (sufficiency review principles)
State v. Jones, 479 S.W.3d 100 (Mo. banc 2016) (viewing evidence/inferences in light most favorable to verdict)
State v. Randle, 456 S.W.3d 535 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015) (high‑speed flight with unrestrained child supports substantial‑risk finding)
State v. Hopson, 168 S.W.3d 557 (Mo. App. E.D. 2005) (flight at high speed through pedestrian areas can create probable accident risk absent actual injury)
State v. Smith, 502 S.W.3d 689 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (definition and proof of substantial risk under §568.045)
State v. Riggs, 2 S.W.3d 867 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999) (knowledge element under child‑endangerment statute does not require proof of actual harm)
State v. Lemasters, 456 S.W.3d 416 (Mo. banc 2015) (clerical errors in judgment may be corrected nunc pro tunc)
McGuire v. Kenoma, LLC, 447 S.W.3d 659 (Mo. banc 2014) (nature of clerical mistakes and limits on substantive change)
State v. Carroll, 207 S.W.3d 140 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006) (record may show trial court’s intent so clerical sentencing errors can be corrected)
State v. Baxter, 204 S.W.3d 650 (Mo. banc 2006) (plain‑error review is limited and requires outcome‑determinative error)
State v. Taylor, 466 S.W.3d 521 (Mo. banc 2015) (plain‑error standard requires facially substantial grounds of manifest injustice)