State v. Moore
1608006943
| Del. Super. Ct. | Mar 16, 2017Background
- At ~1:30 a.m. officers observed a vehicle with darkly tinted windows and, after confirming no medical tint waiver in DELJIS, stopped it for a suspected window-tint violation.
- Two occupants: driver Isaiah Moore and passenger Kevin White; White was immediately taken into custody on an outstanding capias.
- Officer Wiggins believed any non-waivered tint was illegal (later conceded his understanding of 21 Del. C. § 4313 was inaccurate) but testified he would have stopped the vehicle under the correct 70% light-transmission standard because he "couldn't see through the window at all."
- After the stop, the officers removed Moore (no valid license, no registration produced) and—according to Wiggins—requested and received consent to search the vehicle; a body camera failed to record.
- During the search, officers discovered a 9mm firearm under a rear seat; Moore was charged with multiple offenses including possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and window-tint violation.
- Moore moved to suppress the firearm and statements, arguing the stop was unlawful because the officer misunderstood the law and, alternatively, that he did not consent to the search.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Moore's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was there reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle for a tint violation? | Objective facts (dark tint preventing view of occupants + no medical waiver) provided reasonable suspicion despite officer's mistaken understanding of the statute. | Officer's mistaken belief about what § 4313 prohibits means the stop lacked an objectively reasonable basis; inability to see inside at night isn't probative. | Court: Stop was lawful. Under totality of circumstances (dark tint preventing view and no waiver), officer had reasonable suspicion under Trower. |
| Does an officer's mistake of law automatically invalidate reasonable suspicion? | Not where objective facts support suspicion and the officer credibly would have stopped under correct standard. | Relies on Coursey and McDonald to argue mistake of law invalidates the stop. | Court distinguished McDonald and Coursey; here facts (couldn't see occupants; checked waiver) distinguish those cases, so mistake did not invalidate the stop. |
| Was Moore's consent to search voluntary and sufficient to justify the vehicle search? | Officer Wiggins credibly testified he requested and received consent; consent was voluntary. | Moore testified he was not asked and did not consent; bodycam failed to record. | Court found Wiggins credible and concluded Moore consented; search therefore valid. |
| Should evidence be suppressed as fruit of unlawful stop or tainted consent? | Because the stop and consent were valid, suppression is not warranted. | If stop illegal or consent tainted by illegality, firearm and statements must be suppressed. | Court denied suppression; evidence admissible. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Coursey, 906 A.2d 845 (Del. Super. 2006) (suppression where officer's failure to understand law undermined reasonable suspicion)
- State v. Trower, 931 A.2d 456 (Del. Super. 2007) (holding that tint so dark an officer cannot see occupants creates reasonable suspicion)
- Stevens v. State, 970 A.2d 257 (Del. 2009) (distinguishing Coursey where ordinance could be objectively applied)
- McDonald v. State, 947 A.2d 1073 (Del. 2008) (stop invalidated where officer's mistaken view meant no actual violation occurred)
- Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280 (Del. 2008) (consent given after illegal seizure may be tainted and suppressible)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (standard for investigative stops: reasonable articulable suspicion)