State v. Moore
377 P.3d 1162
| Kan. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- In 2005 Moore pled guilty to aggravated indecent liberties with a child; at sentencing the district court scored a 1984 Oregon first-degree burglary (dwelling) as a prior person felony, increasing his criminal-history score and sentence.
- Moore did not challenge his criminal-history score on direct appeal; in 2014 he filed a K.S.A. 22-3504 motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing the prior burglary was misclassified.
- Moore's attack asserted the Oregon burglary statute has a broader intent element than the comparable Kansas statute, so the statutes are not comparable and his prior should be nonperson.
- The State argued Moore’s claim is constitutional and thus not cognizable under K.S.A. 22-3504, and that Moore waived objections by plea/failure to object at sentencing.
- The court treated the issue under Kansas sentencing law and precedent (including Dickey and Williams), analyzed Apprendi/Descamps principles, and evaluated whether the intent difference matters for the person/nonperson classification for burglary.
- Court concluded the Oregon conviction was comparable and properly classified as a person offense because only the dwelling element (not intent) controls person/nonperson burglary classification; it affirmed denial of Moore’s motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Moore) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether classification of Moore's Oregon burglary as a person offense violated Apprendi by requiring judge factfinding beyond proof of the prior conviction | Oregon statute's broader intent element makes it not comparable to Kansas burglary, so prior should be nonperson and the judge improperly increased sentence | Classification is a statutory question; intent-element difference doesn't affect person/nonperson burglary classification; classification properly done by judge | Court held no Apprendi violation: intent difference irrelevant to person classification for burglary; Oregon conviction comparable and correctly scored as person felony |
| Whether Moore could raise this claim via K.S.A. 22-3504 despite being a constitutional challenge | The motion should be allowed because the misclassification affected the sentence and thus made it illegal under Dickey/Neal | Constitutional claims are generally not cognizable under 22-3504; Moore waived some objections | Court held Dickey allows a constitutional challenge that misstates criminal-history score to be raised under 22-3504; procedural objections by State were rejected |
Key Cases Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts that increase maximum penalty must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (limits when courts may consult underlying conviction documents; categorical/modified-categorical approach)
- State v. Dickey, 301 Kan. 1018 (2015) (Apprendi-based holding that classifying a prior burglary as person felony based on judicial factfinding about dwelling element was unconstitutional)
- State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 870 (2014) (comparable offense means similar in nature, not identical; courts compare statutes, not underlying evidence)
- State v. Keel, 302 Kan. 560 (2015) (discussion of person vs. nonperson offense weighting under Kansas sentencing guidelines)
